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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPACT OF RELATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL EMBEDDEDNESS ON 
ALLIANCE TERMINATION OUTCOMES 
Ehsan Fakharizadi 
 
 
 
 
The literature on strategic alliances has extensively studied factors that contribute to the 
formation of alliances, choice of alliance governance, and predictors of alliance 
termination. However, despite extant evidence of high instability of alliance 
relationships, the post-termination outcomes of alliance dissolutions are understudied. In 
this dissertation, I try to investigate the impact of alliance termination on partners’ future 
alliance activity. I study alliance outcomes from a social embeddedness perspective and 
argue that alliance termination can negatively affect firms’ abilities to form new 
relationships, and to maintain their existing relationships. Furthermore, I present two sets 
of competing hypotheses based on two major benefits of network cohesion: informational 
advantage and social control. On the one hand, based on the informational advantages of 
social network, network cohesion can compensate for the adverse effect of alliance 
termination. On the other hand, collective sanctions and punishments resulting from the 
social control mechanism may increase the negative outcomes of alliance terminations. 
Based on the analysis of data on joint venture activities of top global chemical companies 
from 1990 to 2005, I find support for 1) the negative effect of alliance termination on the 
partners’ alliance activities, and 2) the positive impact of network cohesion on alliance 
outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Motivation 
Strategic alliances have increasingly gained popularity among firms (Gulati, Nohria, & 
Zaheer, 2000; Ring & Van de ven, 1994). This increase has attracted the attention of 
many scholars to study the predictors (e.g. Gulati, 1998; Kogut, 1988) and the outcomes 
of alliances (e.g. Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001).  The 
literature on strategic alliances can be categorized into three streams. The first stream 
explores the predictors of alliance formation. Scholars have looked extensively into how 
firms choose their partners and why some firms are more likely to be selected as allies 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995b; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001b). The second stream 
focuses on alliance portfolios and on how a firm’s current set of partners could influence 
its future performance (Gulati et al., 2000; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 
2001). A third group of studies has paid attention to the instability of strategic alliances. 
Scholars have explored both theoretically and empirically the predictors of alliance 
terminations (Cui, Calantone, & Griffith, 2011; Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchell, 2011). 
However, despite extant literature on all stages of alliance lifecycles, we know very little 
about the aftermath of alliance terminations.  
Strategic alliances are inherently instable governance structures. Studies have shown 
between 30 to 50 percent of alliances are dissolved, with an even worse (about 50% to 
70%) record of dissatisfactory alliance performance (Das & Teng, 2000a). Most of the 
studies that manage to estimate the instability rate either use survey method on a limited 
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number of alliances (Parkhe, 1991; Reuer & Zollo, 2005) or focus on joint ventures, 
which are more likely to be covered in the public announcements (Harrigan, 1988; Park 
& Russo, 1996). The unavailability of data on the termination of alliances is a major issue 
in the study of this phenomenon.  
Given the relatively high likelihood of terminations, it is important to understand how 
such events influence firms and their partners. The importance of alliances in providing 
firms with scarce immobile resources suggests that their termination should have adverse 
effects on the partners’ competitive position. This dissertation contributes to the alliance 
literature by attending to this gap and by increasing our understanding of the predictors of 
the post-termination outcomes. Moreover, the effect of alliance terminations could have 
practical implications for the managers who are in the position to decide the fate of their 
firms’ alliances. The following research questions are the focus of this dissertation. 
Research Questions 
1- What are the social outcomes of alliance termination? 
In this dissertation, I intend to explore how (if at all) alliance termination affects partners. 
In doing so, I draw from the extant literature on strategic alliances to predict the social 
outcomes of alliance dissolution. While prior literature has emphasized the importance of 
past relationships on future ties, it fails to distinguish between ties that last and those that 
are dissolved. Past research has also shown that forming new alliances or maintaining a 
strong portfolio of alliances can contribute to learning, organizational status, and 
performance. It is, however, unknown whether terminating an exchange relationship will 
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have any negative impact on organizations. I argue that the likelihood of forming new 
alliances as well as the stability of existing alliances is affected by the termination of 
firm’s relationships.  
2- How does the cohesion in the firm’s alliance network influence the termination 
outcomes? 
Aside from the main effect of alliance termination, it might be even more important and 
certainly more interesting to explore what contextual factors influence the outcomes of 
dissolutions. The contingency of termination outcomes can be studied from several 
economic and social perspectives. In this dissertation, I focus on partners’ embeddedness 
in the social structure to theorize about the effect of partnership dissolutions. Past 
literature on strategic alliances has extensively looked at the role of relational, structural 
and positional embeddedness of organizations in formation of new relationships (Gulati, 
1995b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), creating value from those relationships (Lane, Salk, & 
Lyles, 2001; Uzzi, 1997), and the stability of inter-organizational relationships (Greve, 
Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010; Polidoro et al., 2011). However, the linkage 
between organizational embeddedness and alliance outcomes is missing.  
  
Expected Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to the existing theories in three ways. Firstly, it extends the 
alliance literature by studying post-termination outcomes of alliances dissolutions. To my 
knowledge, there is no past study on the effects of alliance termination on partners, even 
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though alliance there are numerous evidences of high alliance instability rates. The 
theoretical conception presented in this dissertation may open further discussion on the 
post-termination dynamics of alliances. 
Secondly, the results of this study contribute to the embeddedness theory of 
organizational actions. Social embeddedness has been related to several positive 
outcomes, such as learning (Lane et al., 2001), performance (Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, 
& Tihanyi, 2004; Lavie, Haunschild, & Khanna, 2012), and stability (Cui et al., 2011). 
This has led to the general conclusion that organizations should form ties that are highly 
embedded in the social context of relations. However, the embeddedness of ties can act as 
a double-edged sword when the embedded ties are terminated. Studies on the predictors 
of alliance termination have looked at relational and network embeddedness as predictors 
of alliance stability. However, we know very little about what happens to firms that 
terminate their relationship despite being closely embedded in their network.  
Thirdly, I question two major assumptions in the study of alliances: a) Future ties are not 
affected by dissolution of past ties, and b) terminations of a firm’s alliances do not affect 
its other relationships. By investigating the validity of these assumptions, this dissertation 
contributes to our knowledge about how one interorganizational relationship can 
influence other current and future collaborations.  
Finally, by exploring the consequences of alliance dissolution on changes in the network, 
I contribute to the literature on network evolution. Scholar have argued that network of 
interfirm relationships influences and is influenced by formation of new ties and 
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dissolution of existing ties, which leads to an “endogenous network dynamic”, in which 
prior state of the networks affects its state in the future (Gulati, 1998). In this dissertation, 
the termination of one relationship is related to formation and termination of other ties in 
the network, affirming and presenting a mechanism for the “endogenous network 
dynamic”.  
The implications of this research can help organizations in making decisions not only 
about formation of their alliances, but also about which ties to terminate and what to 
expect after the termination goes through. Pursuing alliances that are tightly embedded in 
the social structure may not always be the best course of action. The resulting 
embeddedness can reduce firm’s autonomy and freedom of action such that it cannot act 
purely on its self-interest and needs to consider shared norms and expectations of the 
collective entity. 
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I summarize the extant literature on the strategic alliances and particularly 
the theories related to alliance dissolution. I introduce both extant perspectives in the 
study of firm behavior: economic and social. However, I focus on and go into more 
details about the sociology of organizational actions. I review the main theories that 
explain alliance formation, choice of partners, governance structure, alliance performance 
and dissolution. I further introduce an integrative framework that recapitulates those 
theories. First, I present the past publications that discuss the formation of alliances. 
Then, I go over the literature on alliance termination. The theories used to explain these 
two firm decisions will further be used in proposing post-termination outcomes. From the 
extant literature on social explanations of firm behavior, organizational embeddedness 
view will be reviewed more thoroughly. Finally, the theoretical gaps in the existing 
literature will be identified for exploration.  
 
Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is probably one of the most widely used theories 
in strategy and organizational theory literature. Introduced by Williamson (1975) and 
further developed by other scholars such as Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore 
(1990), this theory gives an explanation for organization’s choice of governance 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Williamson, 1975). While the initial 
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objective of the paper was to predict firm boundaries, its application now extends to how 
firms choose from various institutional forms in coordinating their transactions (Shelanski 
& Klein, 1995). According to this theory, firms’ boundary decisions are based on three 
factors: asset specificity, transaction frequency, and uncertainty. These factors predict the 
likelihood of opportunistic behavior by the transacting actors. Consequently, firms decide 
between arm-length transactions governed by free market mechanism and hierarchy (i.e. 
internalization of the exchange within firm’s boundary). 
TCE theory is based on two main assumptions. It assumes that contracts are 
incomplete. The incompleteness of contracts arises from three underlying assertions: 
Firstly, firms cannot predict outcomes, and they lack the knowledge and skills to foresee 
future and plan for it (Simon, 1957). Secondly, even if firms could plan for future, they 
would not be able to communicate their plans and contingencies with their transaction 
partners (Hart, 1995). Thirdly, even if perfect planning and the communication of those 
plans were possible, partners would not be able to explain their plans and arrangements to 
third parties (e.g. government) who could enforce them. As a result, there is room for 
opportunistic behaviors for any two transacting entities.  
Another assumption of TCE is the bounded rationality of the actors (Williamson, 
1975). The players in the market cannot predict all possible outcomes of the transaction 
and therefore cannot take into account every contingency when setting up the contract. 
Moreover, because buyers and sellers cannot predict each other’s actions and reaction, the 
progress of the exchange in the future will be unknown and leaves room for opportunistic 
behavior. The bounded rationality of the actors is further amplified in the face of high 
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environmental uncertainty. As a result of contract incompleteness and bounded rationality 
of the actors, market mechanism fails to create efficient transactions and firms are inclined 
to internalize some of their exchange relationships. 
Organizations try to protect their transaction specific assets by integration of the 
activities, safeguarding their investments. The likelihood of opportunistic behavior is 
influenced by transaction attributes, such as asset specificity, frequency of exchange and 
uncertainty. The higher the likelihood of one firm taking advantage of the other, the higher 
the costs of transaction. Transaction cost determines the optimal form of governance for 
the exchange. In the following sections, I provide the definitions for each of the main 
constructs used in this theory: 
Asset specificity: Asset specificity is usually defined as the extent to which the 
investments made to support a particular transaction have a higher value to that transaction 
than they would have if they were redeployed for any other purpose (McGuinness, 1994). 
As specific assets relating to a transaction accrue, the possible gains from opportunistic 
behavior increase (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978), leading to higher monitoring and 
transaction costs. The initial TCE model suggested that in a buyer-seller relationship, the 
specific investments are more often than not made by the seller and that the buyer is more 
likely to engage in opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1983). However, later research 
found evidence of specific investments by the buyer, which could lock the buyer in the 
exchange and increase its cost of exit (Klein 1988).  
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Transaction frequency: transaction frequency increases the incentives associated 
with the hierarchical structure of transaction. Williamson proposes that the cost of setting 
up and administering an internal governance structure will be easier to recover for recurring 
large transactions (Williamson 1985). In other words, for one-time transactions firm often 
choose market form of governance, whereas, frequent exchanges are done internally. 
Uncertainty: The literature on TCE often defines uncertainty as “the unanticipated 
change in the circumstances surrounding an exchange” (Noordewier, John and Nevin 
1990) such as demand uncertainty (Heide and John 1990), technological uncertainty 
(Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt 1986) and supplier uncertainty (Walker and Weber 1987). 
However, with less frequency, uncertainty is defined as the unpredictability of partner 
performance (Anderson 1985; Heide and John 1990). 
Asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction frequency together determine the 
costs associated with a transaction, which influences the choice of governance structure by 
the firm. On the lowest extreme of transaction costs, firms choose the market form for their 
exchanges and hierarchical structure is preferred when the transaction costs are high. The 
market structure can be characterized as discrete short-term contracts, which facilitate 
economically efficient transfer of property rights (Ring and Van de Ven 1992). The 
exchanged property, products and services are non-specific and can be bartered between 
many parties. Consequently, the competitive market control provides an efficient 
governance structure for the transaction. The hierarchical form, on the other hand, is 
characterized by legal obligations between the superior and the subordinate. In this 
structure, which is also known as managerial transaction, the obedience of the laborer to 
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the property owner’s commands provides safeguard for transaction continuity and the 
completion. 
In between these two modes, scholars have proposed the existence of hybrid forms 
of governance, which include joint ventures (Klein, Frazer and Roth 1990), relational 
contracting (Palay 1984), and bilateral governance (Heide and John 1990). Some 
researchers suggest a spectrum of governance forms that range from a pure market structure 
to a pure hierarchical form. Ring and Van de Ven (1992) propose two forms of contracting 
as the hybrid exchange structures: recurrent contracting and relational contracting. 
Recurrent contracting involves short-lived exchanges that are repeated over time, while 
relational contracting tend to encompass long-term investments based on recurrent 
bargaining in which disputes are resolved internally. Furthermore, Oxley (1999) suggest a 
range of structures that vary from unilateral contracts (e.g. one-sided licensing, long-term 
supply relationship) to bilateral contracts (e.g. technology sharing, joint research, joint 
marketing) to equity-based alliances (i.e. joint ventures).  
As strategic alliances were added to the viable forms of governance in inter-firm 
transactions, scholars started the study of alliance formation and termination in the light of 
TCE theory. Dyer and Singh (1998) argued that the economic benefits of alliances increase 
with relation-specific investments, size and frequency of exchange and the presence of 
safeguards. Madhok and Tallman (1998) take a value creating perspective in which they 
draw from transaction cost argument to explain the formation and termination of alliances. 
They suggest that asset specificity and specialized resources increase the potential rents 
that could be driven from safeguarded alliances and that internalizing the transactions is 
11 
 
often not the best option. In contrast, they posit that aside from the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior, the discounted value of the partnership as well as the expected 
value of the alliance relationship influence the termination of the transaction (Madhok & 
Tallman 1998). In a similar work, Tsang (2000) employs industrial uncertainty and 
transaction frequency in combination with resource based arguments in explaining the 
choice of alliance structure over internalization of an exchange. 
There has also been some criticism of the operationalization of TCE. The most 
empirically problematic concept in TCE model has been the uncertainty (Shelanski & 
Klein 1995). Some scholars have regressed make-or-buy choice on the uncertainty without 
including asset specificity. It should be noted that if specific investments are not required, 
uncertainty about future events is not a determinant of governance choice (Shelanski and 
Klein 1995). In other words, the TCE theory argues a moderating relationship between 
uncertainty and asset specificity.  
There is also another explanation for the positive relationship between asset 
specificity and internalization of activities in parallel to the original TCE argument. Poppo 
and Zenger (1998) suggest that transaction specific investments are more conducive to 
sharing of language, knowledge and routines that improve efficiency of coordination. 
Consequently, firms’ choice of internalization is not in order to prevent opportunistic 
behavior but a way to increase efficiency. Another line of thought argues that the choice of 
hierarchy over market form is an effort to avoid issues regarding output measurement and 
to minimize contracting costs (Barzel, 1982; Demsetz, 1988). 
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The TCE perspective has also been employed to predict alliance instability. For 
example, Jowkow (1987) finds positive relationship between the specificity of the assets 
in coal supply contracts and the duration of the supply relationship. In the context of joint 
ventures formed in electronic industry, Park and Russo (1996) find that factors that increase 
the cost of transaction (e.g. contracting, monitoring, and conflict resolution costs) decrease 
the instability of alliances. In a multi-industry study, Parkhe (1993) finds support for the 
effect of perceived opportunistic behavior and unrecoverable investment on joint venture 
instability. 
Researchers have criticized the transaction cost arguments on several grounds. The 
TCE theory neglects the fact that exchanges between organizations may repeat. The choice 
of governance structure, according to TCE, is made regardless of the history for that 
transaction or previous governance choices. Opportunistic behavior as a central concept in 
determining the cost of transaction may be regulated by market mechanism. Entities with 
“habitually opportunistic” behaviors will be removed from the transaction market, because 
the repetition of failed transaction develops an unfavorable view of the opportunist (Hill 
1990). Other than the overemphasis on opportunism by transaction cost economists, the 
proposition that contractual instruments are the only way to prevent collaboration hazards 
is also criticized by some scholars (Kale et al 2000l; Gulati 1995). 
Some scholars criticize TCE for not taking into consideration the social context 
within which transactions take place (Granovetter 1985; Hill 1990). Granovetter (1985) 
rejects undersocialization of firms’ economic behavior in several economic theories 
including TCE. He argues that TCE conception does not consider personal relationship and 
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mutual obligations that stem from it as barriers against malfeasance. Along the same line, 
Gulati (1995) suggest that the degree of familiarity and trust between two parties increases 
their likelihood of exchange and provides the ground for less formal governance structures.  
Resource based view of firm 
Resource based view of firm is a response to the overemphasis on the role of environment 
in explaining performance heterogeneity among organizations. While industrial 
organization (IO) theorists emphasize the importance of external factors as determinants 
of sustainable competitive advantage (Bain 1968; Porter 1979, 1980), proponents of the 
resource based view (RBV) focus on the internal organization and the role of resources and 
capabilities (Penrose 1959; Barney 1991). On the one hand, the IO view of competitive 
advantage highlights monopoly rent as the driver of firm performance, and on the other 
hand, RBV suggests Ricardian rents, derived from immobile valuable resources, are the 
foundation of competitiveness. However, as suggested by Wernerfelt (1984), both views 
should yield similar results since they are both in accordance with the traditional concept 
of strategy (i.e. to create fit between firm’s external environment and its internal resources 
and capabilities (Andrews, 1971)).  
Like IO perspective, RBV tries to explain the observable heterogeneity among 
organizations in terms of their market performance. However, RBV attributes 
competitiveness of organizations to their sticky resources as opposed to favorable 
monopolistic market positions. According to RBV, resources and capabilities that are 
valuable and rare may lead to above average rate of returns. Above average returns can be 
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sustained over longer periods depending on how firm’s ability to protect its resources 
against imitation, transfer, or substitution (Barney, 1991). 
The role of resources in the competitive position of organizations has been mentioned in 
early strategy literature (Ansoff 1965). Moreover, the attribution of performance 
heterogeneity to resource endowments was argued more than half a decade ago (Penrose 
1959). However, the main developments of RBV argument took place between mid-80’s 
and mid-90’s (Kraaijenbrink et al. 2010). During that time, scholars proposed many 
“isolating mechanisms” (Rumelt 1984), which secure rent streams for individual firms and 
create barriers against mobility and imitation of resources. Below, I summarize some of 
the more popular isolating mechanisms in the literature. 
Causal Ambiguity. Defined as the ambiguous causal connection between actions and 
results in the creation and operation of productive processes, causal ambiguity can prevent 
perfect homogeneity and protect against imitative entry (Lippman and Rumelt 1982). Reed 
and DeFillippi (1990) argue that tacitness in skills, complexity of skill and resource 
interactions, and specificity of assets create causal ambiguity in the competence-based 
advantage and protect against imitation. In the presence of causal ambiguity, the 
relationship between strategic assets and firm performance will be unclear to competitors, 
which by itself hinders replication efforts. The connection between ambiguity and 
uniqueness of resources is a cornerstone to the resource based view (Mahoney & Pandian 
1992). 
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Path Dependence. The unique historical conditions under which the resources are 
accumulated within firms deter imitation by competitors (Arthur 1989). Organizational 
culture (Barney 1986a), costumer trust (Itami 1987), reputation (Klein & Leffler 1981) and 
first mover advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery 1988) are examples of such path 
dependencies. A common form of path dependence is what Derickx and Cool (1989) refer 
to as “time compression diseconomies”. The development of a capability given a fixed 
amount of investment will be slower when the investment is made over a shorter period. 
Consequently, ceteris paribus, leading firms may be able to sustain their advantage.  
Co-specialized Assets. The interconnectedness between resources refers to the conditions 
in which the development and appropriation of one asset depends on the accumulated stock 
of another asset (Dierickx & Cool 1989). Consequently, the likelihood of imitation and/or 
returns to the employment of co-specialized assets will be lower for competitors.  
Asymmetric Information and knowledge. Information about internal processes of the 
organization as well its external counterparts (e.g. buyers, supplier and competitors) as well 
as knowledge that is created and contained within firm boundaries may be an immobile 
valuable resource (Barney 1986b). Information and knowledge affect the possible set of 
organizational outputs and are jointly generated with outputs (Prescott & Visscher 1980). 
The slow diffusion of knowledge from innovator to imitator (Mahajan, Sharma & Bettis 
1988) creates a response lag (Lippman & Rumelt 1982), which temporarily sustains the 
information advantage for the developer.  
16 
 
Isolating mechanisms explain why firms differ in their resource endowment and 
subsequently, why they achieve different performance levels. The presence of resource 
heterogeneity, however, encourages firms to share their skills and productive capacities 
(Hamel, Doz & Prahalad 1989).  This application of RBV provides an alternative view of 
alliance formation that does not assume perfect resource mobility. According to TCE, firms 
choose between market transactions, internalization and hybrid structure (i.e. alliances). 
However, imperfect resource mobility eliminates the internalization option from the list of 
alternatives. Consequently, forming alliances to gain access to crucial immobile resources 
is inevitable (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996).  
Dependence of organizations on resources controlled by other actors provides one of the 
most frequently theorized antecedents of alliance formation (Salancik 1978; Pfeffer & 
Nowak, 1976; Blois, 1980; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Tsai 2000). Extant literature has 
attributed the formation of alliances to the heterogeneous distribution of different skill 
sets within industries, such as production, marketing, distribution, regulatory approval, 
and access to new technologies (Gulati 1998). Firms’ search for essential resources leads 
to formation of ties among actors with related capabilities, which can entail alliances 
among actors with similar or complementing resources (Chung et al 2000). 
Dependence of firms on their partners’ resources can also lead to instable relationships. On 
the one hand, firms are dependent on each other for strategic resources and on the other 
hand, this dependence creates power asymmetry between the partners, which contributes 
to alliance instability (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Power imbalance resulting from this 
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asymmetry leads to uneven distribution of alliance payoffs, which in turn may increase 
instability.  
The resource-based view of strategic alliances has been criticized on several grounds. 
Gulati (1999) posits that attribution of alliance formation decision merely to existing 
competencies within firms overlooks external opportunities that reside within the social 
network of relationships. He suggests that the opportunity sets available through the 
firm’s network of ties are the primary determinants of alliance formations (Gulati 1991). 
The social network provides opportunities for it members mainly through information 
dissemination (Gulati 1999). The first requirement, before firms form alliances is the 
identification a suitable partner. They need to be aware of the existence of a potential 
partner who has the skills and capabilities that they require and is willing to take part in 
the alliance. Moreover, the potential partner needs to be a reliable one (Balakrishnan & 
Koza 1993). This information can be available to firms through their network of contacts 
(Gulati 1999). Specially, because of the inherent ambiguity and uncertainty of strategic 
alliances, any information about future partners becomes critical, in order to prevent the 
moral hazards of unpredictable opportunistic behaviors.  
The resource-based view fails to explain the choice of partners perfectly, as not all 
alliance opportunities are explored by firms. There are two reasons for incomplete search 
of alliance opportunities. Firstly, firms do not have access to perfect and complete 
information about all potential partners. Secondly, the search for a suitable partner may 
be limited to a smaller group of firms, which are trusted and are considered reliable.  
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Other critics point out the shortcoming of RBV research in assuming firms to be 
atomistic actors behaving regardless of their social context (Baum and Dutton, 1996; 
Granovetter, 1985). I will elaborate on this argument later in my review of the 
embeddedness literature. Proponents of organizational learning suggest a dynamic view 
of interdependence and point out the missing linkage between learning and changes in 
relative dependency. 
Organizational Learning 
In contrast with the transaction cost economics theory, which is based on the assumption 
that alliances are governance structures for transactions of goods and services, the 
organizational learning perspective focuses on the learning that takes place between 
alliance partners. The learning view, suggests that firms possess heterogeneous sets of 
skills and capabilities that they try to complement by forming strategic alliances (Hamel 
1991; Contractor & Lorange, 1988). This view of strategic alliances follows a slightly 
similar logic as the resource based view of the firm.  
Organizational learning point out the incomplete view of alliances as the “mid-house” 
state between market transactions and hierarchical integration and suggest that alliances 
are tools for skill acquisition (Hamel 1991). Some skills are relatively expensive to 
develop internally or through acquisitions and are, therefore, learned through alliances. 
More importantly, some capabilities, such as those referred to by Itami (1987) as 
“invisible assets”, are not easy to transfer through purchasing or to develop internally. 
Consequently, strategic alliances have become an effective tool for skill acquisition. 
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Hamel (1991) points out the interrelationship between learning in an alliance and the 
relative bargaining power of the partners. Alliances evolve as a result of inter-partner 
learning, and consequently the dependence of partners on one another changes. In fact, 
scholars suggest that dependence in alliances can be reduced by “out-learning” the 
partner (Hamel 1991; Kobrin 1986).  
Hamel suggests that the continuation of alliances may not be a positive indicator. It could 
mean that neither of the partners managed to acquire the skills and competencies of the 
other to be able to act independently (Hamel 1991). Conversely, terminated alliances may 
indicate that one partner has managed to acquire the capabilities it needs from its ally. 
The learning literature covers a wide range of context in which firms learn to respond to 
unanticipated conditions. Some of these contexts include merger and acquisitions 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Singh and Zollo, 1999), global expansion (Chang, 
1995), and product market entry (Beamish & Lane 1982; Harrigan & Newman 1990). 
Many scholars have investigated and found evidence for learning through strategic 
alliances and specially joint ventures (e.g. Anand & Khanna 2000).  
Scholars have also argued that tacit know-how is more difficult to transfer (Winter, 1988; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1991; Szulanski, 1996), especially in the inter-organizational 
learning context (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1997: 29). The main challenge in the 
transfer of know-how among partners is attributed to inter-partner competition (Hamel, 
1991; Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria, 1994; Anand and Galetovic, 1999). However, in the 
face of this challenge, some firms perform better in terms of learning from their partners. 
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Some scholars argue that by accumulating knowledge and experience firms become more 
capable of learning new skills and competencies (Bower and Hilgard 1981). Firms that 
form more alliances, “learn to learn” (Estes 1970) and develop a capability which is 
referred to as “absorptive capacity”.  
Because of the accumulating nature of the capabilities in firms’ alliance experiences, 
there will be a path dependence in the learning process, such that firms with accumulated 
learning experience manage to absorb new know-how faster and with less cost than 
others do (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). In the case of alliances, firms with more alliance 
capabilities are able to learn more and appropriate more value from their alliances 
(Anand & Khanna 2000).  
While alliances are primarily viewed as structures to achieve joint objectives and earn 
joint rewards, the learning that takes place within alliances may lead to some private 
benefits for each side of the partnership (Khanna et al 1998). Private benefits are the set 
of skills that a firm can learn from its partner during the course of alliance. In fact, one of 
the reasons firms form alliances with their competitors is to accrue such private benefits 
through learning (Hamel 1991). In inter-competitor partnerships, the balance between the 
competitive overlap of the partners and their relative learning rates determines the 
stability of the alliance (Khanna et al 1998).  
Learning is defined as “the development of insights, knowledge, and associations 
between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions” (Lyles 1988; 
Fiol & Lyles 1985). Parkhe (1991) argues that inter-partner diversity creates 
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opportunities for learning which then stabilizes the partnership. The reverse argument is 
made by Kogut (1988) where he suggests that learning saturation results in alliance 
termination.  
Firms can learn in their alliances not only from their partners but also from the 
partnership itself. Such learning can lead to re-evaluation and re-adjustment of the 
collaborative settings under the initial conditions of the contract. Doz (1996) suggests 
that three scenarios can take place during the evolution of alliances, which can improve 
or hinder the stability of the joint effort. Firstly, if the initial condition of the alliance does 
not allow for learning and reconfiguration of the partnership, the involved firms cannot 
learn and more importantly cannot adjust their goals, tasks, processes, and skills, which 
may destabilize the partnership. Secondly, firms may become aware of the discrepancies 
that need to be overcome (“cognitive learning”) but fail to make the necessary behavioral 
adjustments (“behavioral learning”). In this case, partners may lower their expectations of 
each other and doubt their partner’s willingness to contribute to the partnership. Thirdly, 
despite cognitive and behavioral learning of both sides of the alliance, environmental 
changes may render the alliance obsolete or economically inefficient (Doz 1996). Except 
in the latter scenario, the failure of the partnership may be attributed to the inability of the 
partners to form or to maintain a successful relationship.  
“Learning alliances” have increasingly been employed to respond to uncertainties in the 
technological environment. By entering these alliances, firms manage to develop the 
skills and competencies that may otherwise require too much time and investment to 
acquire. By doing that, firms “reduce their exposure to technological uncertainties” by 
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learning from their partners (Grant & Baden-Fuller 1995). Some firms are more capable 
of internalizing their partners’ knowledge and skills. Scholars refer to this capability as 
“absorptive capacity” and define it as firm’s ability to “recognize value of new external 
knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). 
Absorptive capacity is cumulated over time as a result of continuous learning cycles, 
which results in a path dependent dynamics (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Literature on 
absorptive capacity suggests that the new knowledge can be internalized more effectively 
if it is related to the learner’s existing skills and competencies (Bower & Hilgard 1981). 
Some scholars furthered this argument by introducing a dyad-level construct called 
“relative absorptive capacity”, which is determined by three characteristics of the 
partners: ability to value new knowledge measured using the relatedness of partners’ 
knowledge, ability to assimilate new knowledge, which refers to similarity in the 
partners’ organizational structures and routines, and ability to commercialize new 
knowledge (Lane & Lubatkin 1998). Inter-organizational learning can be accelerated by 
forming joint ventures. Because joint ventures separate organizational structures with 
relatively stable long-term scopes, they are more conducive to development of trust and 
sharing of competencies (Beamish and Banks 1987). 
Absorptive capacity can be broken down to three components: ability to 1) understand, 2) 
assimilate and internalize, and 3) apply external knowledge. The ability to understand 
external knowledge is influenced by interorganizational trust, cultural compatibility of 
the partners, partners’ prior knowledge, and the relatedness of partners’ businesses (Lane 
et al 2001). The ability to internalize new capabilities depends on the flexibility of the 
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partnership, management support, training, formal goals and specialization of the partners 
(Lyles & Salk 1996). Finally, the joint venture’s business strategy and training 
competence determines its ability to apply the internalized knowledge (Lane et al 2001).  
Trust is essential for effective learning in alliances (Lane et al 2001). The social control 
effect of trust provides insurance for firms as they invest in their relationships. In a 
trusting relationship, partners are more open and sharing (Inkpen and Beamish 1997) and 
are less likely to be exploited by their partners (Barney & Hansen 1994) leading to a 
stable learning alliance. Lane and his colleagues (2001) argue that partners’ confidence in 
each other is more important than their willingness to share, because entering an alliance 
naturally requires some risk-taking in that aspect.  
Based on large-sample survey data, Kale and his colleagues (2000) find that the success 
of learning alliances depends not just on the learning of competencies and skills from the 
partners but also on the protection of one’s own proprietary capabilities. More 
importantly, they find that these two outcomes are not mutually exclusive. Alliance 
partners face a constant trade-off between learning from each other and protecting their 
own assets (Khanna et al 1998). This challenge is amplified in the face of conflict, which 
is an inherent element in alliances between partners with different objectives and 
potential opportunism (Doz 1996). Firms can protect their assets and accelerate their 
learning in the alliance by developing relational capital and creating processes to resolve 
conflicts (Kale et al 2000). Relational capital refers to “the mutual trust, respect, and 
friendship” at the individual level between the alliance partners. Conflict resolution 
processes entail formal monitoring of conflict situations, open communication channels, 
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and seeking ‘win-win’ results (Kale et al 2000). Much of the discussions about contextual 
factors that facilitate or hinder inter-organizational learning relate to the core propositions 
of the embeddedness view of organizations.  
Embeddedness 
There has been a long-standing discussion among economists and sociologists over the 
determinants of actions and the origin of institutions (Uzzi 1997; Gulati 1995; 
Granovetter 1985). On the one hand, neo-classical economists suggest that in the 
idealized market, buyers and sellers have no influence over supply, demand, price, and 
the terms of trade. Instead they are “price-taking autonomous actors with access to 
perfect information” and without any protracted exchange relationships (Hirschman 
1982). The neoclassical model of firm behavior is often used as the baseline explanation, 
in which firms are self-interested, profit-motivated actors who maintain arm’s length 
relationship with many suppliers and buyers in the market and avoid interdependence 
(Uzzi 1997).  
On the other hand, Granovetter (1985) advocates Polanyi’s (1944) notion that economic 
behavior is embedded in the social context and both influences and is influenced by the 
structure of the relationships. The embeddedness perspective proposes that social 
relations create rules, norms and obligations for actors and therefore, constrain the range 
of decisions that can be legitimately made by each member (Coleman 1988). 
Furthermore, social context influences the kind of social actions that organizations are 
more likely to pursue (Gulati 1995). In the context of strategic alliances, embeddedness 
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can influence how organizations make decisions such as alliance formation or alliance 
termination. For example, the strength of prior ties affects the likelihood of new tie 
formation (Gulati 1995) and having mutual partners decreases the probability of alliance 
termination between two partners (Polidoro et al 2011). More generally, embeddedness 
research tends to strike a balance between behavioral rationality and economic efficiency 
(Smelser & Swedberg, 1994). 
Both economic rationality and social embeddedness views try to provide answer to the 
“problem of order” – What is the origin of order in economic behaviors and institutions 
(Granovetter 1985). Does order arise merely from rationality of the autonomous actors in 
maximizing their own interest or does it stems from the development of trust, norms, and 
obligations in the social context? Granovetter (1985) answers this question suggesting, 
“Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere 
slavishly to a script written for them” (Granovetter 1985, p. 487).  In his theorization, 
actions are embedded within existing and relatively stable social structures, and do not 
act purely on the basis of self-interest.  
Embeddedness has been defined on several levels. Gulati (1998) distinguishes between 
relational and structural embeddedness. He suggests that the effect of strong ties in 
dyadic relationship is separate from the effect of embeddedness in the broader network. A 
further break down of the concept by Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) includes another 
component, namely the positional embeddedness, which is indicated by network 
centrality. The three components of embeddedness are defined on three levels. Relational 
embeddedness is defined on dyadic level, structural embeddedness is measured using ego 
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network connectedness, and positional embeddedness is related to firm’s position in the 
whole network.  
a. Relational embeddedness 
Relational embeddedness refers to the effect of cohesive ties between two actors on their 
actions (Gulati & Gargiulo 1999). Relational embeddedness can arise from both the 
frequency and the strength of past ties (Greve et al 2010). Prior ties create an opportunity 
for organizations to learn about each other’s resources and reliability, which can reduce 
the uncertainty around their future collaborations (Gulati 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo 1999).  
Many studies have looked at the effect of prior ties on alliance formation (Gulati 1995; 
Gulati & Gargiulo 1999) and alliance termination (Greve et al 2010; Polidoro et al 2011). 
Moreover, having prior cohesive relationship increases partners’ abilities to learn from 
the alliance (Lane et al 2001), and therefore, provides greater value to alliance partners 
than their arm-length transactions (Uzzi 1997).  
b. Structural embeddedness 
In contrast with relational embeddedness, which deals with dyad-level cohesiveness, 
structural embeddedness concerns the presence of triad in the firm’s ego network (Gulati 
& Gargiulo 1999). Embeddedness literature has paid special attention to the role of triads 
in driving organizational actions (Greve et al 2010; polidoro et al 2011). Krackhardt 
(1998) emphasizes the distinction between dyads and triads and suggests that triads are 
more stable micro-structures. He argues that in dyads no majority can be achieved and no 
side can be outvoted. That is not the case in triads or groups of larger size. Consequently, 
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the individuality of actors is stronger in dyads than in triads. Moreover, actors’ 
bargaining power is higher in dyads than in triads. If one side’s demands are not met, the 
threat of breaking the tie will not end the relationship in triads. In fact, the withdrawing 
member will lose the benefits of the relationship that the other members keep enjoying. 
While friction and conflict may sustain or escalate in dyads, the presence of a third party 
can provide resolution. This mediation can take place through intermediating role of the 
third party or by its mere presence (Simmel1950, Karckhardt 1998). 
Krackhardt (1998) then combines the notion of strong ties with the notion of triads and 
defines a Simmelian tie as the following. Two actors are Simmelian tied to one another if 
they are “reciprocally and strongly tied to each other and if they are each reciprocally and 
strongly tied to at least one third-party in common” (Krackhardt 1998). He also argues 
that Simmelian ties last longer because the involved actors are less independent and less 
powerful to dissolve the tie, and because there are inherent conflict resolution 
mechanisms in place. Subsequently he finds that Simmelian ties will occur and will be 
reciprocated more frequently (Karckhardt 1998). 
c. Positional embeddedness 
In comparison with relational and structural embeddedness, positional embeddedness has 
been studied to a less extent. Positional embeddedness is related to the effect of actor’s 
position in the overall network structure on its behavior (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). The 
position of an actor in its social network defines the role it plays in relation to others 
(Wasserman & Faust 1994; Borgatti & Everett 1994). Positional embeddedness goes 
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beyond direct and nearby indirect contacts in the network and provides informational 
benefits and visibility, and makes the actor an attractive potential partner (Gulati & 
Gargiulo 1999). Central actors benefit from early access to new information and better 
access to assets of other players. Nevertheless, they are also at higher risk of leaking 
resources to their connected ties and are more dependent on their alters because of being 
highly connected (Gnyawali & Madhaven 2001). The network position of actors has also 
been used as an indicator of their status (Sorenton & Stuart 2001), and therefore, 
positional embeddedness, to some degree, conceptually overlaps with organizational 
status. It is shown that network centrality influences the type of partners firms choose to 
collaborate with (Podolny 1993) and the type of behaviors they are expected to practice 
towards other actors (Gulati 1998).  
Positional embeddedness also enhances actor’s visibility and signals to the rest of the 
community, actor’s willingness, ability and experience in forming relationships (Gulati 
and Gargiulo 1999), making it an attractive partner. This aspect of positional 
embeddedness, which is particularly important in uncertain contexts, leads to reputational 
benefits for central actors (Podolny 1993; Podolny & Stuart 1995). 
Embeddedness Outcomes 
Embeddedness is related to several firm and network level outcomes (Uzzi, 1997; 
Gnyawali & Madhaven, 2001). In the following sections, I review the mechanisms and 
the processes that are discussed in the literature. In sum, embeddedness has been related 
to rich information exchange (Uzzi 1997), development of trust (Larsen 1992), blurring 
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of organizational boundaries (Hagg and Johanson 1983), social control (partners exercise 
voice instead of exit and joint problem-solving) (Powell 1990, Uzzi 1996), and learning 
(Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 2000). 
a. Interorganizational Trust 
Alongside the notion of self-interest in economic interactions, comes the concept of 
opportunism emphasized by the works of Williamson (1975). Actors who are in pursuit 
of their own interest may take a step further and deviously seek gains in expense of 
others. Institutional economists argue that arrangements are evolved in the transaction 
markets to prevent such actions by making them too costly for the actors (Okun 1981; 
Williamson 1975). In their view, such arrangements, which may be in the form of explicit 
or implicit contracts, are “functional substitutes” for the trust between the transactors 
(Granovetter 1985). However, for the institutional arrangements to work, some degree of 
initial trust needs to be present. Otherwise, even the most sophisticated arrangements can 
be evaded by intelligent actors motivated by self-interest. The institutional economics, 
however, fails to explain the source of this trust. The proclivity of firms to transact with 
familiar (Gulati 1995) or reputable actors (Podolny 1993) indicates that generalized 
morality or formal contracts are not sufficient safeguarding mechanisms. Actors tend to 
seek referrals from trusted common partners, or ideally, use their own past experience to 
assess potential partners (Granovetter 1985). 
Two propositions are put forward by scholars to explain the source of trust: “generalized 
morality” or actors’ tendency to behave trustworthily in absence of regulations and 
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control mechanisms and embeddedness (Granovetter 1985). The social structure and 
relational history can, over time, develop trust and reduce malfeasance between 
transactors. Trust can also stem from a broader perception of firm’s past history, namely 
its reputation (Rinova et al 2005).  
Through qualitative discovery, Uzzi (1997) finds out that embedded ties are often formed 
through third-party referral and previous personal relations. As a result, an initial level of 
expectation and trust is present at the formation of such relationships. Scholars argue that 
the presence of trust not only allows for more flexible governance structure (Gulati 
1995), but also improves the stability of the alliance and its longevity (Das & Teng 1998; 
Greve et al 2010). Therefore, relationally embedded ties are expected to be more stable 
and more valuable (Uzzi 1997; Lane et al 2001). 
b. Conflict Management 
Strategic alliance researchers have consistently argued and observed that alliances are 
instable structures (Das & Teng 2000; Broschak, 2004; Burt, 2000), surrounded by 
interorganizational friction and conflict (Greve et al 2010; Larson 1992). Relational and 
structural embeddedness, however, decrease the inherent conflicts before they arise and 
help resolve them once they occur. Relationally embedded partners (i.e. two actors that 
are strongly tied and have a history of frequent exchange relationships with each other) 
become more adjusted to one another through discussion, socialization and development 
of shared norms and opinions (Coleman, Katz & Menzel 1996; Gulati 1998). Conflicts 
between relationally embedded actors are, therefore, negotiated and resolved faster.  
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Structural embeddedness decreases the friction between partners in at least three ways. 
Firstly, common partners of structurally embedded allies can act as mediators and convey 
concerns of one ally to another if direct communication is not available, and therefore, 
prevent heated tension. Secondly, if conflict arises, common partner can facilitate the 
negotiation process to resolve the issue. Thirdly, the presence of common partners 
reduces the likelihood of one side leaving the alliance, because of possible damage to 
reputation and sanctions by the common partners (Macaulay 1963).  
Scholars note that the inter-partner conflicts are often not observed, because firms try to 
settle them out of courtrooms (Williamson 1975), and more importantly without 
reference to contracts or threatening to litigate (Macaulay 1963). One explanation for 
hesitation to pursue lawsuits and legal actions against opportunist partners is actors’ 
preference to “behave decently” or to stay in business with the other partner or the rest of 
the community (Macaulay 1963). 
It should also be noted that power inequality could also reduce the level of conflict 
between partners. Because the more powerful partner can exercise power and enforce its 
preferences over its partner’s (Granovetter 1985), friction between partners with 
unbalanced positional embeddedness may not lead to legal conflict. If the two sides are 
relatively equally matched, conflicts can become public (Granovetter 1985).  
Nonetheless, if an actor exploits its partner’s trust and acts opportunistically in an 
embedded relationship, the relationship between them may get irrationally 
confrontational. Uzzi (1997) finds anecdotal evidence that firms particularly avoid taking 
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advantage of their strongly tied partners fearing vengeance. However, there is no 
empirical study on the post-termination dynamics of embedded and non-embedded tie 
break-ups.  
c. Information Flow 
Firms enter alliances as a means to access valuable information and reduce uncertainty. 
Social structure provides its embedded members with information regarding external 
opportunities such as new ideas, new markets and ways to pool resources as well as 
external threats such as competitors’ moves, deviant behavior of other actors, and adverse 
market conditions (Burt 1992). Fast access to valuable information, new ideas and 
opportunities is one of the basic benefits of embeddedness (Uzzi 1997; Gulati 1998; 
Coleman 1988), whether it is through direct ties (relational embeddedness) or indirect 
sources (structural and positional embeddedness). 
The flow of information from one partner to another is directly related to the strength of 
their relationship (Lane et al 2001). However, the value of the information may be higher 
if it is received from the weak ties (Granovetter 1973). This seemingly contradictory 
finding is explained based on the fact that the information circling among strongly tied 
actors in tightly connected network areas is relatively redundant (Burt 1992). More 
importantly, everyone has the same level of access to that information, which lowers the 
potential returns (Granovetter 1973). On the other hand, weak ties and ties that are less 
embedded in the social structure provide access to brand new information that can 
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differentiate the focal firm’s position in relation to its competitors (Burt 1992; Rowley et 
al 2000).  
One particular type of valuable information that disseminates through the network is 
information about new opportunities. For example, Gulati (1998) finds that alliance 
formation opportunities are often presented to the firm by its network of contacts. 
Moreover, firms that initiate the alliance seek partners from their past relationships and 
among those that they are directly or indirectly familiar with (Gulati 1998).  
d. Reputation 
Firm reputation is an intangible asset that accumulates over time based on the quality of 
firms output and its “public recognition” (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). 
Organizations benefit from their own (good) reputation, and also benefit from the 
reputation of those with whom they are affiliated (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001a). For 
example, research has shown that favorable reputation improves firm’s relationship with 
its supplier, customers and partners (Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997; Rindova et al., 
2005), its market valuation (Gulati & Higgins, 2003), and above average returns 
(Deephouse, 2000). 
While reputation is shaped based on actor’s position in the network and actor’s history of 
observable behavior, it influences the expectations of future performance and behavior 
(Rindova et al., 2005). Consequently, organizations utilize reputation as a partner 
selection mechanism to reduce uncertainty. Reputable actors have superior access to 
information and knowledge, which makes them attractive for collaboration (Gulati 1998).  
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Granovetter (1985) draws contrast between the ways direct or indirect ties versus 
reputation prevent deviant behavior. Damage to reputation can be a disincentive to 
opportunistic behavior, and therefore, actors avoid behaving in a way that creates a 
general dissatisfaction among other players. However, reliance on reputation, as a signal 
may diminish, as richer more reliable information is available (Granovetter, 1985). 
Scholars also stress the importance of direct experience (Gulati 1995) and third party ties 
(Krackhardt 1998) in providing information the overrides reputation signal because 
information from such channels is cheaper, richer, more detailed, and more reliable. 
Consequently, one can expect that relational and structural embeddedness have stronger 
effect than positional embeddedness in this regard.  
e. Social Control 
Firms embedded in highly interconnected networks develop shared behavioral 
expectations (Rowley 1997). Dense network acts in parallel to strong ties to moderate 
firm behavior in networks of actors with established expectations. Such actors can punish 
disobedience in organized collective retaliation (Coleman 1988). Monitoring, sanctioning 
and rewarding cooperative actions are some characteristics of dense network.  
Networks with high density (very interconnected) provide faster and more efficient flow 
of information and assets, trust, shared norms and common behavior patterns, and easier 
sanction enforcement (Gnyawali & Madhaven 2001). High-density networks are 
amenable to less actions and more reactions. In other words, firms find out about others’ 
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actions faster and sanctions and retaliations are exercised sooner (Gnyawali & Madhaven 
2001). 
Polidoro and his colleagues (2011) affirm the social control argument suggesting that 
“the shadow of others” (common partners) can increase alliance stability in the same way 
that “the shadow of the future” (reciprocity) does. They find that the presence of common 
partners reduces the hazards of joint venture terminations, especially when the partners 
have asymmetric network positions or when the partners are competitors. They suggest 
that having common partners works as a social control mechanism that inhibits 
collaboration risks (Polidoro et al 2011). 
Network closure may vary in different parts of the network. In fact, in some networks 
groups of actors can be identified who are tightly connected among themselves and 
loosely connected to the rest of the network. These cohesive groups are called cliques 
(Wasserman & Faust 1994). There is ample evidence that cliques are frequent 
phenomena (Gulati 1999; Guliati & Gargiulo 1999; Kogut and Walker 2001; Nohria and 
Garcia-pont 1991), which can be explained noting that organizations tend to repeat ties 
with their past contacts and with those with whom they have common partners (Rowley 
et al 2005). Cliques act as governance structures, which enhance the development of 
trust, create shared norms, enable collective monitoring and provide conflict resolution 
mechanisms (Gulati 1998; Rowley et al, 2005). Consequently, actors within the cliques 
face restrictions in the way they can act (Burt 1992).  
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There is some recent empirical evidence indicating that tie dissolution can trigger 
collective actions against actors that terminate their relationship. In a study of shipping 
liner industry, Greve and his colleagues (2010) observe that during the break-up of 
multimember alliances, strongly connected firms act jointly in withdrawing from the 
alliance or staying in the alliance while weakly connected firms leave. Furthermore, 
Polidoro et al (2011) call for investigation into the outcomes of alliance termination 
despite the possibility of sanctions.  
Downsides of Embeddedness 
There is a debate on the overall benefits of network cohesion (Gargiulo & Benassi 2000; 
Rowley et al 2000). On the one hand, Coleman (1988) suggests that the 
interconnectedness of a firm’s network is beneficial by providing fast access to 
information, developing norms and trust, and controlling socially undesirable behaviors. 
On the other hand, Burt (1992) argues partnering with actors who are not connected to 
each other creates autonomy, non-redundant information flow, access to new idea and 
increased bargaining power. Firms positioned on the structural hole will have higher 
bargaining power in their relations with others (Burt 1992). Moreover, in the creation of 
new relationships, firms with intermediary positions are more sought for and once the 
relationships are formed those firms will have more negotiation power against their 
partners (Gulati 1998).  
While each position entails its own benefits and both of them are forms of social capital 
(Rowley et al 2000), scholars suggest that the two forms of social capital are not 
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necessarily contradictory, but rather play different roles, which are valuable for different 
populations or purposes (Burt 1998). Rowley et al (2000) study the effect of network 
interconnectedness on returns to strong ties. They find that strong ties in steel industry 
and weak ties in semiconductor industry positively affect performance. Their study 
supports the same contingency approach to the aforementioned dilemma, by suggesting 
that under different circumstances, one or the other form of social capital becomes more 
valuable. More specifically, they find that in dense networks weak ties are more 
beneficial than strong ties. Moreover, uncertainty and innovation rate requirements 
influence the optimal network structure (Rowley et al 2000).  
Rowley et al (2000) argue that the best choice of ego network interconnectedness 
depends on firm’s decision to either explore or exploit external opportunities. Sparse 
networks are more conducive to diffusion of novel ideas. On the other hand, dense 
networks provide a suitable context for exploiting existing opportunities through 
established connections. Environmental uncertainty determines the innovation rate 
required to prosper. The emphasis in exploration (sparse networks) is on the breadth of 
knowledge, while the emphasis in exploitation (dense networks) is on the depth of 
knowledge (Rowley et al 2000). 
Uzzi (1997) argues that embeddedness as a “logic of exchange”, enhances the economies 
of time and allocation of resources as well as integration of agreements and adaptations to 
complexity. However, he suggests that the returns to embedded relationships diminish as 
embeddedness increases. After an optimal level, embeddedness may lead to creation of 
information silos isolated from external sources of ideas. Some economists suggest that 
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social relations in fact create inefficiencies in the market place by influencing actors’ 
ability to undertake the right action (Peterson and Rajan 1994). Rowley et al (2000) also 
posit that dense network and strong ties have overlapping beneficial characteristics. 
Therefore, in the presence of one, returns on the other are less “dramatic”.  
Social relations can also increase force and fraud (Granovetter, 1985). Firstly, trust 
increases the gains of conducting opportunistic behavior. In the presence of trust, actors 
stop short of maintaining extensive enforceable arrangements, allowing misconduct and 
advantage-taking behavior. Secondly, certain types of misconduct requires collective 
action and therefore requires some level of trust among conspirers – what Granovetter 
calls “honor among thieves”. Thirdly, in the absence of social network of relations only 
dyadic conflicts can arise. However, sometimes conflicts and wars take place between 
two groups of actors. In such cases, siding with one opponent or the other requires a 
context of social relations (Granovetter, 1985).  
Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) find support for Burt’s argument that lack of structural holes 
limits actor’s authority and freedom of action. They posit that “amplified reciprocity” 
reduces the flexibility of the tightly embedded actors and hinders their adaptation to 
changes. Moreover, as a result of inertia, firms that are in close contact with many 
interconnected partners may be less aware and less receptive to new perspectives. This 
“cognitive lock-in” isolates the clique from new ideas and opportunities in the 
environment (Gargiulo and Benassi 2000; Grabher 1993; Uzzi 1997).  
Conclusion 
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Extant literature on strategic alliances has studied different stages of alliance lifecycle. 
There are numerous studies of the predictors of alliance formation. Questions such as 
‘why do firms form alliances?’ and ‘How do firms benefit from alliances?’ are the focus 
of these studies (e.g. Kogut 1988; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo 
1999). The second stream deals with firms’ choice of partners and questions such as 
‘which pair of firms are more likely to form a relationship?’. Scholars have recognized 
both economic (Meuleman 2010; Chung et al 2000) and social (Gulati 1995; Li & 
Rowley 2002) logics behind partner selection. Current literature has also addressed 
questions regarding the effect of strategic alliance on partners’ learning (Lane et al., 
2001) and performance (Sarkar et al 2001; Baum et al 2000). Finally, some studies have 
investigated the predictors of alliance terminations (Park & Russo 1996; Kogut 1988; 
Greve et al 2010; Cui et al 2011), some of which have treated alliance termination as a 
proxy for alliance performance (e.g. Arino 2003).  
Despite some existing theoretical arguments about potential outcomes of alliance 
terminations (Macauley 1963; Krackhardt 1998; Krackhardt 1999; Polidoro et al 2011; 
Gnyawali & Madhaven 2001), there is no research, to my knowledge, on the post-
termination stage of alliance lifecycle. More importantly, alliance terminations can occur 
under various circumstances. For example, there is a distinction between planned and 
unplanned dissolutions (Polidoro et al 2011). Unplanned dissolution can be a result of 
inter-partner competition (Park & Russo 1996; Park & Ungson 1997), unequal 
contribution to the alliance (Arino & Torre 1998), or market trends making the venture 
more attractive to one of the partners (Kogut 1991; Li, Dhanaraj & Shockley 2008).  
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Some studies of strategic alliances treat alliance termination as a measure of alliance 
(Berg & Friedman 1980; Arino, 2003). This view has been criticized by others who call 
for distinction between success of an alliance and its stability (Gulati 1998). While some 
successful alliance may be terminated, some other underperforming alliances may go on. 
An alliance may also be a transitional stage before an acquisition or a divesture, and 
therefore, achieve its objectives. Alliances that continue to exist, on the other hand, may 
do so because of the high exit costs or inertia of the partners or the venture (Gulati, 
1998).  
Another aspect of alliance termination is its asymmetry. For example, an observable form 
of asymmetry is in multifirm alliances or syndicated relationships, where firm exits can 
be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary exit can take place where one firm decides to 
unilaterally terminate its ties with its partner. Involuntary exit is when either a group of 
firms decide to oust out the unwanted member (requires coordinated action), or a firm 
fails to renew its ties with the rest of the group (Rowley et al 2000).  
Another theoretical and empirical difference in types of alliance terminations is observed 
by Park and Russo (1996). After recognizing the distinction between termination of joint 
ventures due to failure and due to acquisition, they found that predictors of joint venture 
failure are different from predictors of joint venture acquisition. Terminations due to 
failures are more likely when partners compete, and are less likely when they have other 
concurrent relationships or when they have common partners. On the other hand, 
terminations due to acquisition are more likely when the joint venture when partners 
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contribute similar resources, or have unequal shares in the JV and is less likely when 
partners have concurrent ties or the JV involves R&D (Park & Russo 1996).  
The theories discussed in this chapter reveal several economic and social drivers of firm 
behavior. These drivers specifically influence organizational decisions to form, operate, 
and terminate alliances. Because I intend to investigate, in this dissertation, the 
consequences of alliance termination decision on firms and on the network, it is 
important to identify what factors lead to alliance termination in the first place. I also 
enlist the drivers of alliance formation for two reasons. Firstly, existing theories suggest 
that the termination of an alliance can influence partners’ other collaborative interactions 
both with each other (Uzzi 1997) and with third parties (Krackhadt, 1998). Therefore, I 
include in this chapter a summary of determinants of alliance formation and predictors of 
alliance termination. Secondly, network-level consequences of termination manifest in 
terms of changes in the network structure. These changes depend on both termination and 
formation of alliances in the overall alliance network. Thus, it is important to recognize 
the factors that trigger structural changes in the network – namely formation of new ties 
and dissolution of existing ties.  
Based on the literature reviewed in this chapter several antecedents of alliance formation 
and termination can be identified. Table 1 summarizes the predictors of alliance 
formation and termination in the literature. Polidoro et al (2011) recognize that factors 
that attract partners to each other are different from those that keep them together. For 
example, they find that while repeated ties increase the chance of collaboration between 
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two actors, for central players repeated ties increase dissolution likelihood (Polidoro et al, 
2011).  
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 Rationality Antecedents of Alliance Formation Antecedents of Alliance Termination 
Potential Consequences of Alliance 
Termination 
Resource-
Based View 
Firms form alliances 
to access immobile 
resources of one 
another on which 
they depend in order 
to perform well. 
(+) Resource similarity (Tsai 2000; Das & 
Teng 2000) 
(+) Resource complementarity (Harrigan 
& Newman 1990; Dyer & Singh 1998; 
Gulati & Gargiulo 1999; Chung et al 
2000) 
(−) Power imbalance (Inkpen & 
Beamish 1997) 
(−) Resource complementarity (Cui 
& Kumar 2012; Greve et al 2010) 
Alliance termination hinders partners’ access to 
valuable resources: 
 negatively affects their economic 
performance, and 
 reduces their attractiveness as potential 
allies in their other relationships. 
Transaction 
Cost 
Economics 
Combined cost of 
transactions and 
production 
determines the most 
efficient form of 
transaction (i.e. 
market, hierarchy, or 
hybrid). 
(+) Relational specific investments (Dyer 
& Singh 1998) 
(−) Transaction frequency (Williamson 
1985) 
(+) Partner uncertainty (Anderson 1985; 
Walker & Weber 1987) 
(+) Environmental uncertainty (Tsang, 
2000; Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt 1986) 
(+) Transaction costs (e.g. 
monitoring, contracting, conflict 
resolution) (Park & Russo 1996) 
(−) Asset specificity (Joskow 1987) 
(−) Relational-specific investment 
(Madhok & Tallman 1998; Dyer & 
Singh 1998) 
Alliance termination leads to loss of relationally 
specific investments, and increases partners’ 
uncertainty as future allies. Therefore, alliance 
termination destabilizes partners’ existing 
relationships and reduces their ability to form 
new alliances. 
Learning 
Firms enter alliance 
to learn the skills and 
capabilities that are 
essential for their 
performance.  
(+) Absorptive capacity (Dyer & Singh 
1998) 
(+) Learning incentives (Hamel 1991; 
Contractor & Lorange 1988; Kobrin 1986) 
(+) Technological uncertainty (Grant & 
Baden-Fuller 1995) 
(+) Learning saturation (Kogut 
1988; Young & Olk 1994) 
(+) Asymmetric learning rate 
(Khanna et al 1998) 
 Alliance termination reduces the firm’s 
ability to learn from its partners, damages 
economic performance. 
 Partners that terminate their alliances due 
to saturated learning may be perceived as 
opportunistic and may be avoided by other 
firms for future formations.  
Embeddedness 
Organizational 
decisions such as 
alliance formation, 
partner selection, 
alliance governance, 
and alliance 
termination are 
influenced by the 
social structure in 
which they are 
embedded.  
 Relational embeddedness 
(+) trust (Gulati & Gargiulo 1999; Chung 
et al 2000; Das & Teng 2001) 
(+) prior ties (Gulati 1995; Coleman, Katz 
& Menzel 1996) 
 Structural embeddedness  
(+) common partners (Rowley et al 2005; 
Krackhardt 1998) 
 Positional embeddedness  
(+) status similarity (Podolny 1993) 
(+) reputation (Rindova et al 2005; 
Dollinger et al 1997) 
(+) joint centrality (Gulati & Gargiulo 
1999) 
 Relational embeddedness 
(−) trust (Park & Russo, 1996; Das 
& Teng 1999) 
(−) prior ties (Polidoro et al 2011; 
Greve et al 2010) 
 Structural embeddedness  
(−) common partners (Greve et al 
2010; Park & Russo, 1996; 
Krackhardt 1999) 
 Positional embeddedness 
(−) status similarity (Polidoro et al 
2011) 
 Alliance termination reduces partners’ 
embeddedness in the social structure, 
which may lead to unfavorable social 
outcomes.  
 The developed trust built through repeated 
strong ties or the presence of third party 
mediators may be used to overcome the 
negative impact of alliance terminations.  
 Alliance termination may be perceived as 
a violation of inter-partner trust and 
established shared norms, and may trigger 
collective sanctions against one partner or 
the other.  
Table 1 – Extant Literature on Antecedents of Alliance Formation and Alliance Termination 
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Firms’ motivations to enter alliances are summarized by Kogut (1988) into three 
categories: transaction cost benefits, enhancing competitive position and market power, 
and learning. On a broader level, there are some industry characteristics that increase the 
overall rate of alliance formations such as competitive intensity, industry development 
stage, and demand and competitive uncertainty (Gulati 1998; Harrigan 1988; Shan 1990; 
Burgers, Hill, and Kim 1993).  
Gulati summarizes the prescriptions in the literature to prolong alliance duration as 
flexible alliance management, trust building, effective inter-partner communication, 
conflict management, presence of boundary-spanning personnel, and managing partner 
expectations. (Gulati 1998). Gulati (1998) identifies some of the factors that may lead to 
termination of alliances, such as industry concentration, growth rates, partners’ country of 
origin, concurrent ties, partner asymmetry, alliance age, competitive overlap, and 
characteristics of the venture itself such as autonomy and flexibility (Beamish, 1985; 
Harrigan, 1986; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Kogut, 1989).  
In the following chapter, I introduce a conceptual model to address post-termination 
outcomes of alliances. Based on some existing theoretical logics, I extend our 
understanding of the effect of alliances on partners as well as the broader network 
structure. To satisfy this purpose, I draw mostly from the embeddedness view of 
interorganizational relationships, which I complement with some insights from the 
economic rationality view of alliances.  
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CHAPTER III – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
Strategic alliances are essential means for organizations to perform. They provide 
an intermediary governance structure between market transactions and the hierarchical 
form (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990; Oxley, 1999), that helps firms create a balance between 
control and flexibility as they pursue shared ventures. Firms rely on their partnerships for 
critical yet immobile resources necessary for performing in their markets (Pfeffer & 
Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Through these collaborative efforts, alliance 
partners can learn new skills and acquire capabilities from their allies (Anand & Khanna, 
2000; Hamel, 1991). The transfer of skills and know-how between partners and the 
diffusion of information at firm-to-firm contacts makes alliance networks ideal conduits of 
ideas and practices. Being part of an interconnected web of strategic alliances not only 
benefits organizations in terms of access to information and opportunities but also 
influences the way they make decisions and achieve their goals (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 
1997). 
Strategy scholars have extensively investigated the impacts of alliances on 
organizational performance, from both economic (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000) 
and social (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996) perspectives, using both economic and 
social rationalities (Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2012). There are numerous studies on drivers 
of alliance formation (for a review see Kogut, 1988 and Gulati, 1998), firms’ choice of 
partners (Luo, 1997), alliance performance (Harrigan, 1985; Parkhe, 1993), and 
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determinants of alliance termination (Das & Teng, 1999; Cui et al, 2011; Polidoro et al, 
2011). Comparatively, as discussed in the previous chapter, little attention has been paid 
to the dissolutions of alliances and their impact on the alliance partners. For the most part, 
alliance termination has been used as a proxy for the performance and stability of the 
alliance (Arino, 2003) rather than as a deliberate action that, by itself, can influence the 
organizations’ future performance. 
This overlook can be partly attributed to the difficulty of doing research on alliance 
terminations. For reputational and image-related reasons, organizations are often motivated 
not to disclose their alliance terminations. While reporting formations of new relationships 
enhances how an organization is viewed by its investors, creditors, customers, and 
employees, termination of the same relationship would generally be interpreted as an 
unfavorable outcome. Despite this challenge, some studies have managed to observe 
alliance dissolution on limited samples through manual data collection and surveys (Das 
& Teng, 2000a) but stopped short of investigating post-termination outcomes. 
To answer the question of ‘what are the consequences of alliance termination for 
partners?’ several theoretical approaches can be applied. As reviewed in the previous 
chapter, resource-based view, transaction cost economics, learning theory, and 
embeddedness literature explicate different aspect of strategic alliances. In this chapter, I 
draw upon a combination of these theories to build my arguments about the main effect of 
alliance termination. Moreover, I particularly employ arguments from the embeddedness 
view of organizations to argue how the outcomes of alliance termination can be contingent 
on the closure in the ego network of alliance partners.  
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The theoretical predictions of this chapter can add to our understanding of alliance 
terminations as the last stage of alliance lifecycles. Moreover, the conceptualization of 
embeddedness outcomes that is presented in this chapter puts in contrast predictions made 
by two views of social capital benefits. One the one hand, network closure is argued to 
have a negative impact on organizations that terminate their relationships by triggering 
retaliation and decreasing the focal firm’s attractiveness as a partner (e.g. Krackhardt, 
1999; Burt, 1992). On the other hand, some scholars argue that network closure provides 
firm with support from their community and enhances their partnership opportunities (e.g. 
Coleman, 1988).  
In this chapter, I first present an overview of the literature on alliance instability 
before I predict the main effect of alliance termination for partners. Then, I draw on 
embeddedness literature to predict, through competing hypotheses, the moderating role of 
partner embeddedness in the social network. I discuss how alliance termination may lead 
to positive or negative outcomes, contingent on the position of the terminated tie in the 
network. Potential implications of these predictions are discussed in the conclusion. 
Theoretical Background 
To answer the research question of this dissertation, I combine two overlapping 
streams of research, the literature on the evolution of strategic alliances and the 
embeddedness view of firm behavior. Strategic alliances, as a governance structure, have 
been studied from various angles using different theoretical lenses such as resource-based 
view (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), transaction cost theory 
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(Williamson, 1975; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990), learning (Hamel, 1991; 
Contractor & Lorange, 1988), and embeddedness view (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). 
The combination of these theories has formed a general understanding of why firms enter 
alliances (Kogut, 1988; Gulati, 1998), how they manage their relationships with their 
partners (Lyles & Salk, 1996; Anand & Khanna, 2000) and why they terminate those 
relationships (Greve et al, 2010; Cui et al, 2011). However, we know very little about the 
consequences of alliance terminations.  
The embeddedness perspective, provides a social view of the drivers of firm 
behavior, one that includes firms’ decisions regarding their alliances. The core hypothesis 
of the embeddedness literature reiterated in numerous conceptual (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 
1997; Gulati, 1998) and empirical studies (Gulati, 1995; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; 
Rowley et al, 2000) posits that actions of organizations influence and are influenced by the 
social context surrounding the firm.  
An embeddedness perspective may be particularly appropriate for this dissertation, 
because the main dependent variables that I study are social outcomes. My hypotheses are 
regarding partners’ ability to form new alliances and to maintain their existing alliances. 
Such social outcomes could be best investigated using a theoretical lens that can explain 
social mechanisms. Also, most theoretical mechanism used in the social network literature 
are in one way or another related to the embeddedness view. 
Furthermore, there are some propositions and arguments put forward by proponents 
of the embeddedness view that are never tested in an empirical setting. For example, some 
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scholars have argued that the degree of embeddedness of actors in their social structure 
improves the stability of their relationships because breaking such ties will result in 
negative reactions by the focal actor’s peers (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). This gap in 
the empirical findings of the embeddedness view provides me with an opportunity to test 
these propositions in the context of joint venture alliances.  
Current studies of organizational embeddedness have related it to alliance 
formation (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), alliance performance (Lavie et al, 2012; Dhanaraj et 
al, 2004), partners’ learning from the alliance (Lane et al, 2001), and alliance termination 
(Polidoro et al, 2011). The general findings of these studies show a positive outcome for 
being tightly embedded in the network structure in terms of alliance stability and 
performance. However, less attention is paid to the downsides of being tightly embedded 
in the social context (Krackhardt, 1999; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).  
In the following sections, I propose that alliance termination may negatively impact 
firm’s ability to form new partnerships and the stability of its existing relationships. 
Further, I introduce the arguments suggesting that in the event of alliance termination, 
embeddedness may lead to disintegration of ties, sanctions and more conflict as predicted 
by some scholars (Granovetter, 1985; Krackhardt, 1999; Uzzi, 1997). I also depict 
arguments that predict positive outcomes resulting from being positioned in a tightly 
connected network (Coleman, 1988).  
Alliance Instability 
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To understand how alliance termination affects partners, it is important to note, 
first, why alliances are formed, and second, why alliances are terminated. I distinguish 
between economic and social benefits of alliances for two reasons. First, alliance 
termination may affect these two sets of benefits in different ways. Secondly, the 
underlying mechanisms that relate alliance stability to economic and social benefits can be 
different (Ahuja et al., 2012).  
A major part of the discourse on strategic alliances strives to answer why firms join 
efforts in strategic alliances. Scholars have answered this question from different 
standpoints. The most straightforward answer to this question is that firms enter strategic 
alliances to gain access to the essential resources required by the external environment (Das 
& Teng, 2000b). Gulati (1995b) summarizes the other rationales behind the strategic 
alliances as reduced transaction cost when firms adopt a hybrid form of transaction between 
market and hierarchical structures (Williamson, 1985), improved learning (Hamel, Doz, & 
Prahalad, 1989; Kogut, 1988), institutional pressure (Venkatraman, Loh, & Koh, 1994), 
gaining legitimacy (Sharfman, Gray, & Yan, 1991), and better strategic position (Gulati, 
1995a; Kogut, 1988). 
The resource sharing explanation of alliance formation results from the 
heterogeneity in firms’ resource endowments, which makes them dependent on each other 
in order to perform (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Strategic alliances are a way to 
overcome this dependence and to procure the required skills and competencies. Moreover, 
strategic alliances help firms overcome uncertainty in their environment by sharing risks 
and investments. Empirical studies show that involvement in alliance activities is also 
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positively related to desirable outcomes such as organizational learning (Anand & Khanna, 
2000; Powell, Koput, & SmithDoerr, 1996) and financial performance (Baum et al, 2000; 
Sarkar et al, 2001).  
Outcomes of strategic alliances are not limited to economic benefits. Having ties 
with others can result in social benefits. Wasserman and Faust (1994) note that the 
foundation of prominence or prestige is being connected to other actors. This 
connectedness leads to higher visibility, which increases the focal actor’s general 
reputation. Furthermore, firms with more partners signal willingness and ability to form 
alliances (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) and signal quality in delivering outputs (Podolny, 
1993). As a result, actors with more central positions in the network benefit from an 
accumulative advantage and receive a “disproportionate share of new ties” (Powell, White, 
Koput, & Owen-Smith, 2005).  
Collaborative activities also lead to formation of trust between partners leading to 
reduction of monitoring and control costs and increasing return to the alliance (Das & Teng, 
1998). Duration and frequency of prior relationships increases the familiarity between 
partners, develops expectations, and reduces opportunistic behavior. Moreover, when 
searching for new partnerships, firms rely on their past experience or the information they 
receive from their contacts to find potential partners (Granovetter, 1985).  
Another social outcome of alliance activity is bargaining power resulting from 
asymmetric dependence between partners. Alliances formed by firms influence their 
network position and in turn their autonomy and bargaining power in their relationships 
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(Burt, 1992). The degree of resource dependence between two partners is not always 
symmetric, which results in one partner having more power in leading the partnership. 
Firms’ relationships with other actors in the industry can also act as a safeguard against 
opportunism by providing shared norms, monitoring of deviant behavior, conflict 
management and threat of sanctions (Coleman, 1988; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001).  
Nevertheless, not all alliances last as long as they are planned to. There are 
numerous empirical evidences pointing to the high dissolution rate of alliances. In a review 
of research on alliance instability, Das and Teng conclude that the termination rate of 
alliances is estimated between 30% and 50%  and more importantly less than half of all 
alliances yield satisfactory results from the partners’ points of view (Das & Teng, 2000a). 
The high frequency of alliance terminations has gained attention of some scholars, who 
have studied the determinants of alliance failures. Polidoro et al (2011) present a 
fundamental explanation for the instability of alliances. They posit that while instability is 
an inherent feature of asymmetric alliances, firms still form asymmetric relationships in 
order to pool complementary resources (Ahuja, 2000; Mitchell & Singh, 1996). Such 
asymmetry in the prominence, the resource endowment, and the performance benefits 
partners in the short-run but reduces the longevity of the relationship. On the other hand, 
partners that are more alike are more likely to compete, which results in a yet another form 
of instable relationship (Saxton, 1997). Instability can be a result of power imbalance, as 
in the former case, or it can be due to competition and market overlap as in the latter. 
Some studies of strategic alliances treat alliance stability as a measure of alliance 
performance (Berg & Friedman, 1980; Arino, 2003). This view has been criticized by other 
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strategy researchers who call for a distinction between performance and stability of 
alliances (Gulati, 1998). While some successful alliance may be terminated, some 
underperforming alliances may prevail. An alliance may also be a transitional stage before 
an acquisition or a divesture, and therefore, achieve its objectives by allowing a smoother 
reorganization. Alliances that continue to exist, on the other hand, may do so because of 
the high exit costs or inertia of the partners or the venture (Gulati, 1998).  
Another aspect of alliance termination is its asymmetry. For example, an observable 
form of asymmetry is in multi-firm alliances or syndicated relationships, where exits can 
be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary exit can take place where one firm decides to 
unilaterally terminate its ties with its partner. Involuntary exit is when either a group of 
firms decide to oust out the unwanted member, which requires coordinated action, or when 
a firm fails to renew its ties with the rest of the group (Rowley et al, 2000).  
Another theoretical and empirical difference in types of alliance terminations is 
observed by Park and Russo (1996). After recognizing the distinction between termination 
of joint ventures due to failure and due to acquisition, they found that predictors of joint 
venture failure are different from predictors of joint venture acquisition. Terminations due 
to failures are more likely when partners compete, and are less likely when they have other 
concurrent relationships or when they have common partners. On the other hand, 
terminations due to acquisition are more likely when the joint venture when partners 
contribute similar resources, or have unequal shares in the JV and is less likely when 
partners have concurrent ties or the JV involves R&D (Park & Russo, 1996).  
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Just like the predictors of alliance formation, the antecedents of alliance dissolution 
can be divided into economic and social factors. Complementarity of resources (Cui & 
Kumar, 2012; Greve et al., 2010), alliance-specific investments (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; 
Dyer & Singh, 1998), Learning saturation (Kogut, 1988; Young & Olk, 1994), and 
competitive overlap (Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 1997) are some of the economic 
factors that can trigger terminations. Social predictors of alliance termination include 
interorganizational trust (Park & Russo, 1996; Das & Teng, 1999), prior relationships 
(Polidoro et al, 2011; Cui et al, 2011), shared partners (Krackhardt, 1998; Greve et al, 
2010), and status imbalance (Polidoro et al, 2011).  
Firms tend to refrain from disclosing information about their motives and economic 
rationality for various reasons. Especially in the case of a terminated relationship, very 
little information is made public due to the sensitivity of the issue and its potentially 
negative impact for the focal firms. Nevertheless, after an alliance is terminated at least 
some of the economic benefits of the relationship may be lost. Following alliance 
terminations, firms lose access to the resources and skills of their partners, which can lead 
to reduced learning and may increase the risk, as firms need to invest alone.  
To explain social consequences of alliance termination, I argue that termination of 
one relationship can influence other relationships of the partners. In other words, firm’s 
ability to form a new alliance or to maintain an existing one is affected by the termination 
of its past alliances. As suggested by previous literature (e.g. Coleman et al, 1996; Rowley 
et al, 2005), firms rely on their own previous experience and their contacts for finding new 
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allies, because it is too costly to evaluate every partnership option and because the quality 
of other actors is uncertain.  
Moreover, alliance termination makes partners less connected and therefore less 
visible. As a result, they may be less “cognitively available”, when other actors search for 
partners. Furthermore, as the firm’s number of partnerships reduces due to the termination, 
its attractiveness as a willing and capable potential partner decreases. Therefore, firms 
searching for a partner may not notice the firm and even if they do, they may perceive it as 
an unattractive choice. Moreover, because details of alliance terminations are often not 
disclosed, firms with terminated relationship may be considered risky and uncertain 
partners. Consequently, termination of past relationships can negatively impact firm’s 
ability to form new relationships. 
Hypothesis 1: Alliance termination negatively influences the likelihood of 
formation of future alliances by the partners. 
Dissolution of alliances may also destabilize partners’ other relationships for three 
reasons. Firstly, terminations reduce the value of firms as conduits of information and other 
resources. Through interorganizational relationships, firms obtain access directly to their 
partners’ resources and indirectly to the resources and capabilities of their partners’ 
partners. By dissolving their alliance, firms become less attractive to their other allies 
because they may not be able to disseminate information and critical resources in the 
network the way they could before the termination took place.  
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Secondly, ending a relationship undermines partners’ centrality in the network and 
lowers their overall status. Subsequently, alliance termination reduces the reputational 
value of maintaining a relationship with the firms involved in the termination. The decline 
in the centrality of the firms involved in terminations may lead their other contacts to 
abandon their relationships with them. This can lead to a vicious cycle triggered by one 
termination event. 
Finally, alliance termination can trigger sanctioning by third parties and retaliations 
by common partners who may side with the other partner. It has long been argued that 
third-party contacts stabilize alliances by creating a safeguard threat against 
underperformance and terminations. Common partners may engage in “collectively 
retaliation” by terminating their relationships with one side of the partnership (Coleman, 
1988; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Macaulay, 1963). Evidence of such collective 
behavior was witnessed by Greve and his colleagues in their study of mutli-firm alliances, 
where they observed joint withdrawal from such alliances by closely connected firms 
(Greve et al., 2010). I hypothesize that alliance dissolution can increase the instability of 
partners’ other relationships. 
Hypothesis 2: Alliance termination positively influences the likelihood of 
termination of partners’ other existing alliances. 
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Embeddedness 
After Granovetter’s (1985) seminal article, many strategy researchers and 
organizational theorists started including measures of social embeddedness in the study of 
alliance behavior (e.g. Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Lavie et al, 2012). The embeddedness 
perspective proposes that social relations create rules, norms and obligations for actors and 
therefore, constrain the range of decisions that can be legitimately made by each member. 
On the other hand, highly embedded actors (i.e. actors positioned in dense areas of the 
alliance network) benefit from high quality information and reliable access to resources. 
Extant research on organizational embeddedness has studied how firms’ decisions 
regarding their alliance activities can be attributed to their positions in the alliance network 
and the configuration and quality of their relationships with others. For example, studies 
show that the strength of prior ties affects the likelihood of new tie formation (Gulati, 
1995b) and having mutual partners decreases the probability of alliance termination 
between two partners (Polidoro et al, 2011). More generally, embeddedness research tends 
to strike a balance between behavioral rationality and economic behavior (Smelser & 
Swedberg, 1994).  
Scholars have distinguished between two types of embeddedness: relational, and 
structural (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Relational embeddedness, defined on dyad-level 
refers to the strength of ties between an actor and its partners (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), 
and can arise from both the frequency and the duration of past ties (Greve et al, 2010). The 
strength of ties facilitates the formation of inter-partner trust and reduces the risk of 
partnership-specific investments. Repeated ties improve the organizations’ opportunities 
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to learn about each other’s capabilities, routines, and reliability, which can reduce the 
uncertainty around their current and future collaborations (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999). Extant literature has studied the effect of relational embeddedness on 
alliance formation (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) and alliance termination 
(Greve et al, 2010; Polidoro et al, 2011). Moreover, the frequency and the strength of 
relationships have been related to partners’ abilities to learn from each other (Lane et al, 
2001), which makes relationally embedded ties more valuable than collaborations under 
arm-length conditions (Uzzi, 1997).  
Structural embeddedness refers to the presence of common partners in a dyadic 
relationship (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Embeddedness literature has paid special attention 
to the role of triads in driving organizational actions (Greve et al, 2010; polidoro et al, 
2011). Krackhardt (1998) emphasizes the distinction between dyads and triads and 
suggests that triads are more stable microstructures, partly because in dyads, no majority 
can be achieved and no side can be outvoted. That is not the case in triads or groups of 
larger size. Therefore, the individuality of actors is stronger in dyads than in triads. 
Furthermore, actors’ bargaining power is higher in dyads than in triads. If one side’s 
demands are not met, the threat of breaking the tie will not end the relationship in triads. 
In fact, the withdrawing member will lose the benefits of the relationship that the other 
members keep enjoying. While friction and conflict may sustain or escalate in dyads, the 
presence of a third party can provide resolution. Conciliation can take place through 
intermediating intervention of the third party or by its mere presence (Karckhardt, 1998). 
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The intermediation of common partners in structurally embedded ties also facilitates trust 
and enhances learning (Lane et al., 2001; Reagans & McEvily, 2003).  
I also make a distinction between embedded ties and embedded firms. Relationally 
embedded ties are strong ties that are repeated between two partners several times. Such 
ties result in the development of trust and create some familiarity between the partners 
regarding each other’s routines, personnel, products, and culture. This familiarity make 
future cooperation less costly and less uncertain. Furthermore, because firms tend to choose 
partners that they know and recall, they are more likely to choose their new partners from 
their existing ones. This self-reinforcing cycle may result in an even higher relational 
embeddedness to the point that the value of repeating a tie is less than exploring new 
partnership opportunities.  
Structurally embedded ties, or ties in which the partners have several common 
allies, are argued to be more stable (Krackhardt, 1998). The mediating role of third parties 
not only facilitates the formation of ties through referrals in the first, but also lets the 
partners to start their cooperation with an initial level of trust. In essence, structural 
embeddedness creates trust and reliability by association with a common actor. The 
presence of common partners also prevents and reduces friction between the alliance 
partners. If structurally embedded ties are terminated, the associated common partners may 
take side with one of the ex-partners and retaliate against the other.  
Relationally embedded firms are firms whose form and maintain strong ties with 
their partners. These firms prefer their past contacts in their search for new alliance 
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partners. The established relationships that are repeated over time allow relationally 
embedded firms to safely share resources and transfer information with their partners. 
Structurally embedded firms are those firms positioned in densely connected areas of 
network. The partners of such firms are connected to each other forming a clique of firms. 
Therefore, one the one hand structurally embedded firms benefit from heavy flow of 
quality information, and on the other hand, their actions are restricted by expectations and 
norms of their immediate network.  
In sum, highly embedded firms, relationally or structurally, are under greater 
influence from their peers and their community. However, the effect of embeddedness can 
go both ways; on the one hand firm may benefit from shared norms and established 
expectations, which can facilitate inter-organizational trust and on the other hand, they may 
receive redundant information from multiple sources and their decisions may be 
constrained. I argue that relational and structural embeddedness influence how alliance 
termination affects focal partners, but before I hypothesize an interaction relationship, I 
distinguish between two types of benefits arising residing in social networks (Gulati, 1998). 
These two benefits result in opposing mechanisms that moderate the effect of alliance 
termination on partners.  
Information Benefits of Embeddedness 
One of the basic benefits of embeddedness in the alliance network is access to 
valuable relevant information. Such information could be about new market opportunities, 
new technologies, or events in the industry (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 
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Katz, & Menzel, 1966). Embeddedness contributes to three important factors regarding the 
transfer of information in the network: timing, reliability, and quality. The timeliness of 
the information transfer is especially important, where first mover advantage exists. 
Connected areas of the networks are more conducive to the flow of information, as multiple 
paths exist between the sources and the receivers. As a result, information travels faster, 
when firms have stronger ties or are located in dense networks. 
Another effect of multiple information flow paths in dense networks is the 
reliability of information. Information received from trustworthy contacts that are 
relationally embedded with the focal firm is more reliable than the information received 
from newer partners. Moreover, in the presence of multiple information sources the 
reliability of the information could be easily verified, which adds to the value of 
information.  
Dense networks also have higher capacity for transmitting detailed fine-grained 
information. Embeddedness can create familiarity and trust between two partners or in a 
cluster of tightly connected firms. Such affinity leads to targeted information transfer, in 
which firms are more likely to receive quality information that is relevant to their business. 
However, the information that flows through dense networks may have one 
important shortcoming. Some social network theorists have argued that clan-like dense 
clusters of firms may be blind-sighted to new ideas and innovations that goes on outside 
their clique (Burt, 1992; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). The trade-off between reliable fine-grained 
information available inside dense networks and non-redundant diverse information 
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passing through structural holes has compelled some researchers to seek reconciliation 
(Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). For example, Rowely 
and his colleagues (2000) found that the benefits of embeddedness varies from one industry 
to the other (Rowley et al., 2000). 
In sum, firms that are highly embedded in their network, either through strong ties 
with their partners or due to the presence of triads in their ego networks, receive higher 
quality reliable information in a timelier manner. These firms may discover new venture 
opportunities before less connected firms. Also, due to the reach of their ego network, they 
may be better able to find new partners. Embeddedness can also be interpreted as a sign of 
trustworthiness. Firms that have strong ties and are part of multiple triads are more likely 
to be perceived as reliable partners.  
As discussed above, alliance termination can increase the uncertainty of the 
involved firms as potential partners, reduce their visibility, and undermine their access to 
information and other valuable resources. To answer the second research question 
regarding the impact of embeddedness on the termination outcomes, one can draw on the 
information benefits of embedded relationships. Firms with embedded ties can leverage 
their access to valuable information to compensate for the adverse effects of alliance 
terminations. The social capital accrued from the embedded ties can help them sustain their 
good reputation, stay visible to other firms seeking partners, and maintain their access to 
network resources.   
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Relational embeddedness develops interorganizational trust (Moran, 2005; Rowley 
et al., 2000), which may negate the uncertainty-creating effect of alliance dissolution. 
When terminating their alliances, firms that have several repeated ties with their partners 
may be viewed as trustworthy rather than uncertain and unreliable partners. Furthermore, 
relationally embedded firms are more likely to receive referrals from their partners 
(Shipilov, 2005), which can increase their visibility. Finally, since relational embeddedness 
facilitates sharing of skills and resources (Dharanaj, Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 2004; 
Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003), it can reduce the negative impact of terminations. Therefore, the 
overall effect of alliance termination on a firm’s ability to form new alliances or to maintain 
their existing ones decreases when the focal firms is relationally embedded.   
Hypothesis 3: Relational embeddedness reduces the effect of alliance 
termination on: a) the likelihood of formation of future alliances by the 
partners; b) the likelihood of termination of partners’ other existing 
alliances. 
Structurally embedded firms (i.e. firms that are in triadic relationships) benefit from 
intermediated relationships with their partners, where the third party helps resolve potential 
conflicts (Krackhardt, 1998), balances the power asymmetry (Granovetter, 1985), and 
stabilizes the relationship (Greve et al., 2010; Polidoro et al., 2011). Structural 
embeddedness may also increase the firm’s attractiveness as a potential partner. For 
example, Choi and Kim (2008) show that suppliers that are structurally embedded in the 
supplier network are more attractive to buyers (Choi & Kim, 2008).  
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Another outcome of structural embeddedness is the informational advantage that 
comes with the position of the firm in the broader network (Gulati, 1998). Connectedness 
in a firm’s local network increases the capacity of the flow of information and improves 
the reliability of the information as it can be verified by multiple sources. Better access to 
reliable information also improves the firm’s ability to discover collaboration 
opportunities.  
How a firm is positioned in a constellation of collaborative relationships may also 
affect its uncertainty as a potential partner. Structural embeddedness can reduce this 
uncertainty and act as a signal of reliability to outsiders in search of collaborators (Gulati, 
1998). As a result, dense ego networks can help firms mitigate the adverse effects of 
alliance termination by providing informational advantage and by legitimizing the firm as 
an attractive partner. 
Hypothesis 4a: Structural embeddedness reduces the effect of alliance 
termination on: a) the likelihood of formation of future alliances by the 
partners; b) the likelihood of termination of partners’ other existing 
alliances. 
Social Control Benefits of Embeddedness 
Besides access to valuable information, social networks can provide actors with 
control over other members (Gulati, 1998). The control benefits can be achieved through 
two methods. Firms can acts as tertius gaudens by being positioned between two other 
firms and a derive rents from controlling the flow of information and resources. Such 
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positions located in the less connected areas of networks are called “structural holes” and 
benefit their occupants by giving them autonomy and letting them control the flow of 
information (Burt, 1992). According to Burt (1992), firms whose partners are connected 
will have less control over their peers and less freedom in their own actions.  
The other side of the control benefits of social networks results from shared norms, 
rules and obligations in densely connected clusters of firms (Coleman, 1988). Closed 
networks reinforce trust, and create expectations of how each member of the network 
should act. The collective interest of the cluster, then, becomes more important that 
individual gains inhibiting opportunistic behavior. The constraint on the individuals’ 
actions, referred to as “social control”, is essential in the stability of the existing social 
structure. Social control allows actors to securely share resources and exchange favors.  
While social control prevents deviant behavior, it leaves actors more vulnerable to 
such behavior. The expectation that other members will not pursuit their self-interest at the 
expense of others’ well-being, leads actors to act less cautiously (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 
1998). For example, Gulati (1995) finds that relational embeddedness between partners 
leads them to rely more on informal personal relationships and less on detailed formal 
contracts. Therefore, it can be expected that acting opportunistically is easier and more 
profitable when shared norms and tacit expectations exist (Granovetter, 1985). 
Even though the lack of formal structure makes it easier for actors to break 
collectively established norms and rules, the threat of social sanctions limits such 
behaviors. A member that does not meet its obligations or the expectations of the 
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community, may be punished by its partners (Coleman, 1988). Members of the dense 
network structure may punish the opportunistic behavior by informing their contacts of the 
misconduct, underinvesting in their exchanges with the deviant firm, or even terminating 
their relationships with it. As a result, firms that are highly embedded in their local 
networks may face harsher outcomes as they terminate their relationships with their 
partners. 
Strategic alliances require significant investments by both side of the partnership. 
Some of these investments are relationally specific (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Dyer & 
Singh, 1998) and therefore cannot be utilized for other tasks should the alliance dissolve. 
As a result, unplanned termination of alliances can incur sunk costs and may undermine 
partners’ performances.  On the other hand, relationally embedded partnerships, due to 
their potentials, attract more investments from the partners. Therefore, their termination 
will have a stronger negative impact on both sides of the relationship. Extant research 
shows that relationally embedded ties are more valuable to partners than less cohesive 
relationships (Uzzi, 1997). Moreover, relational embeddedness facilitates effective inter-
partner learning (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997).  
As discussed above, alliance termination results in negative social and economic 
outcomes through several mechanisms. Termination decision can signal uncertainty about 
the reliability of the partners in maintaining a durable relationship in which investments in 
the alliance can pay off. Secondly, firm visibility is reduced as a result of having less 
contacts in the network, who can refer the focal firm for future partnerships. Thirdly, as 
alliances dissolve, firms not only lose access to their partners’ resources but also face 
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limited information inflow. Additionally, alliances can improve firms’ status through 
association with prominent actors. Being related to high status players increases firm’s own 
status (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Thus, termination of an alliance may also affect 
the partners by reducing the association advantages of being a prestigious actor’s ally. 
Finally, decision to terminate a relationship can trigger sanctions by third party actors, such 
as common partners (Coleman, 1988; Krackhardt, 1999) or retaliation by the former 
partner (Uzzi, 1997). Below I explain how each dimension of embeddedness amplifies one 
or more of the aforementioned five mechanisms.  
If embedded ties, despite their tendency to last longer (Polidoro et al, 2011; Greve 
et al, 2010), are terminated, they can have a more severe negative impact on the partners’ 
reputation for being reliable partners. Specially, such ties are often associated with more 
investments, which may not be freely utilizable elsewhere. Therefore, termination of 
relationally embedded alliances can turn alliance partners into uncertain if not unreliable 
potential partners in the eyes of other actors.  
Along the same line of logic, relational embeddedness can destabilize focal 
partners’ other relationships. Partners of firms with terminated alliances may become 
hesitant to invest time and strategic resources in their relationships with the focal partners, 
because they may fear the same outcome for their own alliances. Moreover, in the cases 
where alliance termination is a result of severe conflict between the partners, relational 
embeddedness can increase the likelihood of irrational retaliation (Uzzi, 1997), and lead to 
further tension in the ego network of partners. In sum, relational embeddedness can 
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increase the strength of the negative effect of alliance termination on stability of partners’ 
other relationships.  
Hypothesis 5: Relational embeddedness increases the effect of alliance 
termination on: a) the likelihood of formation of future alliances by the 
partners; b) the likelihood of termination of partners’ other existing 
alliances. 
Mutual partners can influence outcomes of alliance dissolution by 1) publicizing 
the event, 2) make partners more careful about displaying cooperation, and 3) lower the 
risk of opportunistic behavior (Burt, 2001). The reputational signal of alliance termination 
disseminates in the network faster if alliance partners have many common partners. As a 
result of faster and broader spread of information about structurally embedded ties, the 
negative effect of alliance termination may be amplified. As the information circulates 
through the network, firms that rely on referrals to find new partners may avoid 
approaching actors involved in the terminated alliance.  
Structural embeddedness creates shared norms and opinions, collective monitoring, 
and social control. Network closure resulting from structural embeddedness prevents 
deviant behavior and enforces punishment of opportunists (Coleman, 1988). In the event 
of alliance termination, alliance partners’ common contacts may side with one of the 
partners and terminate their relationship with the other. Such collective behavior has been 
argued by several scholars (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Krackhardt, 1998) and has 
been observed in empirical settings (Greve et al, 2010). Therefore, alliance termination 
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may destabilize more alliances if the partners are structurally embedded, i.e. have more 
common partners. 
Dense networks act in parallel to cohesive ties in regulating firm behavior by 
establishing expectations and developing trust. Actors in high closure networks can punish 
disobedience in organized collective retaliation (Coleman, 1988). Monitoring, sanctioning 
and rewarding cooperative actions are some characteristics of dense network. The resulting 
safeguard allows safer collaborative effort, and faster and more efficient flow of 
information and assets (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). 
Hypothesis 6: Structural embeddedness increases the effect of alliance 
termination on: a) the likelihood of formation of future alliances by the 
partners; b) the likelihood of termination of partners’ other existing 
alliances. 
Conclusion and Implications 
The propositions presented in this chapter add to the extant literature on strategic 
alliances by exploring post-termination outcomes of alliances. Prior literature has paid 
proper attention to firms’ alliance formation experiences, but there is almost no research 
on how firms’ alliances unfold (Pangarkar, 2009).  I build on the existing literature on 
alliance formation and alliance instability to predict both social consequences of alliance 
terminations for the partners.  
Alliance termination can negatively affect partners’ abilities to form future 
relationships or to maintain their existing ones. Termination of a tie affects the partners by 
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reducing their visibility to firms looking for potential collaborators (Gulati, 1998). As firms 
become less connected their access to information and other valuable resources can be 
diminished, which makes them less attractive in the eye of future and existing partners. 
Finally, termination event may be considered a signal of unreliability, because they may 
increase the perceived likelihood of similar outcomes for partners’ other relationships. The 
expected alliance stability is an important factor in determining alliance formation 
decisions, because returns to the investments in the partnership will be greater if the 
alliance lasts longer. Conversely, firms may withdraw their investments from the 
partnerships that they deem to end soon.  
I also add to the embeddedness view of firm behavior by hypothesizing how 
embeddedness in the social structure can lead to positive or negative outcomes for actors. 
Previous studies have directly related the embeddedness dimensions to organizational 
outcomes, such as alliance formation and alliance termination. In contrast, I take a 
contingency approach and suggest that firms are influenced by events such as alliance 
termination differently based on their degree of embeddedness in the social context. 
Specifically, I use the distinction between two sets of benefits that arise from 
alliance network embeddedness to develop my arguments. Social networks can benefit the 
actors by providing them access to valuable information about new venture opportunities, 
innovations, ideas, and characteristics of other actors. Such benefits can help firms that 
terminate their alliances overcome the negative outcomes of alliances such as reduced 
visibility, damage to reputation, and loss of positional advantage. Therefore, based on the 
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informational advantage perspective of social benefits, the adverse effects of alliance 
terminations is less when partners are tightly embedded in the alliance network. 
On the other hand, alliance networks provide social control benefits that hinder 
non-conforming behavior. Extant literature and empirical studies suggest that 
embeddedness of firms and their relationships in the social context is positively related to 
several positive outcomes such as trust, shared opinions among actors and their contacts, 
collective monitoring, enhanced learning, and transfer of fine-grained information. 
However, high embeddedness can also restrict firm actions and may reduce its autonomy. 
In other words, the resulting cohesiveness between organizations forms a collective entity 
that confines actions of its constituents to behaviors that are in the interest of the group.  
Scholars have argued and shown that relational and structural embeddedness 
increase alliance stability, by providing safeguards against terminations (Greve et al., 2010; 
Polidoro et al., 2011). They argue that terminations can trigger collective sanctions by 
third-party actors who may end their partnerships with the focal firm resulting in a 
‘contagion effect’. Some evidence of such collective action was observed by Greve and his 
colleagues (2010). Based on this perspective, the social control exerted on members of the 
network can increase the negative effect of alliance terminations. 
The predictions of the two sets of competing hypotheses have implications for 
managers in making decisions regarding alliance formation and termination. Firstly, the 
potentially negative effect of alliance termination should be taken into account when 
organizations consider entering new alliances. Such outcomes can be especially important 
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depending on whether the new alliance is going to be formed in a dense area of network or 
with a highly embedded partner.  
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CHAPTER IV – CONTEXT AND DATA 
Context 
Existing studies of interorganizational relationships have focused on several types 
of collaborative arrangements such as contractual agreements (Joskow, 1987; Poppo & 
Zenger, 1998), joint ventures (Ahuja, Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009; Cui et al., 2011; Park & 
Russo, 1996), venture capital syndications (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007; Sorenson 
& Stuart, 2001b), and underwriting collaborations (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 
2005; Rowley, Greve, Rao, Baum, & Shipilov, 2005). These collaborative structures that 
range in the continuum of hybrid governance forms, differ in the way they connect firms 
and in the type of resources that they allow the partners to exchange. For example, scholars 
argue that joint ventures require more relationally specific investments and are more 
conducive to inter-partner learning (Lane et al, 2001). On the other hand, non-equity 
contracts are flexible arrangements that require less investment and their terminations are 
less costly. Moreover, contractual relationships often involve a specified duration. 
Syndications and underwriting collaborations require coordinated efforts of two or 
more firms, facilitate learning, and reduce the uncertainty involved in the alliance 
objectives (Lerner, 1994). Through these structures, firms pool their resources and 
expertise as they invest in a new company or underwrite a public offering. Studies of such 
alliance forms have looked at the effect of alliance on both partners (Sorenson & Stuart, 
2001; Hochberg, 2007) as well as the company that receives the investment (Hochberg, 
2007).  
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Because the focus of this dissertation is the study of alliance terminations, it is 
necessary to choose a context that allows identification of terminated relationships. Due to 
their relatively small size and immateriality, contract terminations are often not disclosed 
by the partners. Moreover, the details of the contracts are often unobservable to the 
researchers, unless they have inside information provided by either of the partners 
(assuming it does not violate confidentiality). Studies of non-equity alliances are often 
conducted with the researchers focusing on one central firm and its relationships with all 
its suppliers or buyers (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In doing so, the problem of collecting in 
depth data about alliance termination can be overcome by securing the cooperation of the 
central firm in disclosing information about its relationships. A challenge in the study of 
non-equity alliance terminations is that contracts often have specific durations. Therefore, 
contracts that are concluded prior to their end date need to be treated differently from those 
that end as planned. However, not always is such information readily available.  
Terminations of underwriting and syndication ties are different from the 
terminations of dyadic relationships, in that they often involve more than two firms. 
Therefore, one member’s withdrawal may not be due to the instability of its relationship 
with all other members. Firms that leave investment syndications may do so out of 
incompatibility with some other members, or because they may not be interested in 
investments in further rounds. As a result, the study of syndication withdrawals lacks the 
ability to identify whether the termination is voluntary. Furthermore, researchers cannot 
find out the conflict between which two members has resulted in the ousting.  
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Another plausible context for the study of alliance termination is joint ventures. 
Joint ventures are one of the most studied cooperative settings in the alliance literature. 
From a researcher’s point of view, the most attractive feature of joint ventures is the 
separation of collaboration tasks from both sides of the partnership into a new entity. This 
feature allows the study of alliance performance irrespective of partners’ performances 
(Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006). Moreover, because joint ventures require 
relatively significant investments compared to other forms of relationships, their effect of 
the partners is easier to observe. Joint ventures are particularly popular in the studies of 
alliance instability as the disclosure of dissolution or acquisition of material joint ventures 
is often mandated by the law.  
For the reasons presented above, I choose joint ventures for the empirical 
investigation of the dissolution of alliances. More specifically, I focus on the joint ventures 
in the global chemical industry. Chemical industry is driven by a combination of 
technology and manufacturing alliances, unlike pharmaceuticals or semi-conductor 
industry in which technological alliances are the primary form of relationships. Evolution 
of alliances with a strong technological aspect may be affected by the progress of 
technology, or by its failure or success. For example, several drug development alliances 
are terminated as a result of unsatisfactory results in various stages of clinical trials. 
Consequently, alliance termination in these industries should be interpreted with caution.  
Joint venture relationships are very common in the chemical industry. In fact, the 
only other industry that hosts more joint ventures than the chemical industry is the energy 
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industry1. However, many joint venture relationships in the energy industry involve oil or 
gas exploration, extractions, and mining, in which one partner contributes to the 
relationship only by bringing in the rights to explore and exploit the energy source. In such 
alliances, joint ventures are a legal tools to distribute the operational revenues and involve 
relatively little engagement between the partners.  
Prior studies of strategic alliances and particularly alliance termination have also 
used this context (Ahuja et al, 2009; Polidoro et al, 2011). Following some of those studies 
(Gulati, 1995a; Rosenkopf, Metiu, & George, 2001), I limit the scope of this study to large 
players in the global chemical industry for three reasons. First, studying all firms in any 
industry requires huge data collection efforts especially because the number of dyadic 
relationships and the size of network dramatically increase when more firms are included. 
Secondly, top companies in the chemical industry constitute the technological leaders of 
the industry with the majority of the market share2. Thirdly, the size of joint ventures 
between top players is significantly larger due to the resourcefulness of the partners. 
Therefore, by limiting the sample to top firms, a considerable portion of alliance activities 
is still included in the study. Fourthly, when the partners are large public companies, 
alliance terminations are more likely to be reported in the news, which increases the 
reliability and the completeness of data collection. 
 
                                                            
 
1 Categorization of news report in the Factiva Database that use the term “joint venture” or “JV” based on 
industries puts the chemical industry in the second place after energy, oil, and gas industry. 
2 Slightly above 50% according to Chemical Market Reporter.  
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Data Sources 
Existing literature on strategic alliances have used several databases such as SDC 
Platium (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004; Lavie, 2007), MERIT-CATI (Dittrich & Duysters, 2007; 
Hagedoorn, 2002), Bioscan (Carayannopoulos & Auster, 2010; Luo, Koput, & Powell, 
2009), and Deloitte Recap (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Santoro & Mcgill, 2005). Of 
these, the latter two contain data on alliances in the biotechnology sector. A review of 
alliance databases by Schilling (2008) reveals lack of consistency among these databases 
as well as considerable coverage issues. She estimates the coverage of alliances in the SDC 
database to be between 20% and 71%, and in the MERIT-CATI database to be between 
10% and 36% (Schilling, 2009).  
More importantly, these databases lack reliable information on joint venture 
dissolutions. MERIT-CATI contains information on alliance termination dates for only 
about 25% of its entries3. This coverage is even smaller for SDC Platinum, in which less 
than 4% of alliances have termination dates. The incompleteness of termination reports is 
evident considering several studies that report a 30% to 50% dissolution rate for joint 
ventures (Das & Teng, 2000). Consequently, in this dissertation I rely on none of the 
available databases of alliance activities. Instead, I collect data on announcements of 
alliance formation and termination in the news.  
The data used in this dissertation is complete to the degree that partners disclose 
formation and termination of their alliances. This shortcoming also applies to the 
                                                            
 
3 Based on an inquiry made to the database owners.  
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aforementioned databases to an even greater degree. However, due to legal obligations, 
public companies need to disclose their material alliance activities, such as joint venture 
formations and dissolutions. Therefore, by limiting the sample of firms to large companies, 
my data should be more complete than other existing data.  
 
Data Collections 
I use Factiva to collect data on joint venture activities in the chemical industry. 
Factiva provides searchable content from multiple sources including newspapers, trade 
press, consumer magazines, newswires, press releases, web media, social media, and 
transcribed broadcasts. I narrow down the search to the chemical industry and look for 
news articles that mention the terms “joint venture” or “JV” in their title or lead paragraphs. 
Further, I collect and code news reports that have the name of at least one of the focal firms 
in their title. The resulting search is also limited to the news published between 1985 and 
2012 (inclusive). The data collected from the first five years of this period will be used to 
generate the base network for the year 1985. Moreover, data in the last five years of the 
study will be used to measure consequences of alliance termination on the changes in the 
network. As a result, the period of study in this dissertation will be 1985 to 2007 (inclusive). 
Chemical & Engineering News and Chemical Market Reporter compile yearly 
ranking of top companies in the global chemical industries. I combine the top companies 
in these lists from the years 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 to create the sample 
of firms for this dissertation. The size of this list varies across years and is often 50. The 
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aggregated list includes 143 companies, some of which were government-owned or 
national firms. After taking into consideration the availability of other data including 
financial information, the final sample was reduced to 87 companies. 
In coding of the news report on joint venture activities of leading chemical 
companies, I only include joint ventures that involve at least two firms from the sample. In 
studies of social network, it is often difficult to construct the whole network structure due 
to the size of those networks and the time consuming nature of data collection. The major 
benefit of this method is that the network of relationships among the included actors is 
complete. A similar approach has been used in other studies of alliance networks (Gulati, 
1995a; Polidoro et al., 2011). Including alliances outside the current sample could improve 
the overall picture about the industry structure. However, a more complete construction of 
the network requires extensive the data collection and may be an inefficient research 
approach. On the other hand, the most reliable data is related to the most central players, 
which adds to the appropriateness of limiting the scope of the network. 
The initial list of search hits included 24,894 results. After extracting the texts for 
all of the content, I used a program to identify and remove news reports that mentioned 
less than two of the sample companies. As a result, the result list was reduced to 7,940 hits. 
Because the same event is often announced in multiple outlets, I further removed the 
duplicates from the list to end up with 2,012 reports of joint venture activity. I then 
manually coded each event by identifying the companies involved in each event, type of 
the event (formation, buyout, acquisition, dissolution, letter of intent, etc.), and date of the 
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event. Other available details about the joint ventures like the location and size of operation 
were only rarely disclosed and therefore, not collected.  
After removing all redundancies and non-useful announcements, 785 joint venture 
formation, 46 acquisition of joint venture by third parties, 201 partner buyouts, and 44 
dissolutions were identified among the 87 companies in the sample. Moreover, the sample 
includes 572 unique dyadic relationships, out of which 161 have formed more than one 
joint venture over the period of study. 
The resulting network includes relationships among the sample firms that constitute 
the major players in the global chemical industry. Financial data was collected from 
COMPUSTAT database for publicly listed companies in the sample. Other firm-level data 
such as age, industry segment, and headquarter location were collected from the Mergent 
Online database. 
Variables 
The level of analysis throughout the dissertation is firm-level. Therefore, the 
variables presented below are all defined for the focal firm. Except for the stable firm 
characteristics like founding year, number of industry segments4, and location, all variables 
are calculated on a monthly basis from 1990 to 20125. The data is structured in a way that 
accommodates survival analysis. The dependent variables are coded as binary and are used 
                                                            
 
4 Number of industry segments in which a firm is active, may vary over time, but because its changes are 
not frequent, it is treated as a non-varying parameter. 
5 The first five years of the data are used to generate the initial network structure. 
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as the basis for identifying the failure events. Moreover, the independent variables that are 
used in the interaction tests are centered to reduce excessive multicollinearity (Aiken & 
West, 1991). The description of variables and their measurement is below. 
Dependent variables 
Formation of a new joint venture. This variable is binary and equals one when a 
focal firm has formed a new joint venture. To be used in the survival analysis, this variable 
can be interpreted as the time in months from the announcement of one alliance formation 
to the formation of another joint venture by the focal company.  
Termination of an existing joint venture. Similar to time to the previous variable, 
this dependent binary variable equals one when the focal firm terminates one of its existing 
joint ventures. Given that the time increments are in months, this variable can be interpreted 
as the time in months from the announcement of one joint venture termination to the next.  
Independent variables 
JV terminations since last JV formation. This variable is used in models that test 
hypotheses, in which the dependent variable is ‘formation of a new joint venture’. At each 
point in time, this variable equals the number of joint venture terminations since the last 
joint venture formation. In the survival analysis model, JV termination since last JV will 
be a count variable that is defined monthly for each firm.  
JV terminations in the past three years. In testing the hypotheses, where the 
dependent variable is ‘termination of an existing joint venture’, the previous variable 
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cannot be used. Due to the event-format structure of the data to allow survival analysis, the 
previous variable would not contain any valuable information and would perfectly correlate 
with the time variable. As a result, I use this variable to test the effect of past terminations 
on the current event. As its name suggests, this variable indicates the number of joint 
venture terminations by the focal firm in the last three years. As a robustness check, the 
time lag of this variable was changed to one year and five years. In both cases the results 
remained the same, or improved.  
Repeated ties. This variable indicates the total number of repeated ties between a 
firm and each of its partners. Existing studies of embeddedness has used this measure to 
account for a firm’s relational embeddedness (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Meuleman, 
Lockett, Manigart, & Wright, 2010). As an alternative operationalization, I also used the 
average number of repeated ties between a firm and its partners to measure relational 
embeddedness. The results were similar to the ones presented in this manuscript.  
Common partners. This variable equals the total number of common partners that 
the focal firm shares with each of its partners. Number of common partners is the most 
common operationalization of structural embeddedness in the extant literature (Min & 
Mitsuhashi, 2012; Moran, 2005). Alternatively, I used the average number of common 
partners in a firm’s relationship. The results, however, remained unchanged. 
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Control variables 
Joint venture formation activity. Some firms are more active than others in forming 
new alliances. Alliance formation propensity can be due to managerial perspectives, slack 
resources, or availability of alliance opportunities. Moreover, firm that form more joint 
ventures are also more likely to face joint venture termination. To control for these two 
confounding factors, the number of joint ventures formed by the focal firm in the past three 
years was counted and used to measure this variable. Dropping this variable improves the 
results. Alternatively, one and five year time lags were used in the calculation of this 
variable, with no significant change in the results. 
Joint venture termination activity. Along the same line of logic, some firms are 
more active in their alliance activity and have higher tendencies to terminate their 
relationships. To control for the variations in the propensity for alliance termination the 
number of joint venture terminations by the focal firm prior to the start of the current event, 
but no earlier than three years ago, was counted and used to measure this variable. Because 
only terminations prior to the current event are counted, there is no overlap between this 
variable and the independent variables that count number of terminations. Dropping this 
variable does not affect the results. Alternatively, one and five year time lags were used in 
the calculation of this variable, with no significant change in the results. 
Degree. This variable measures the number of unique partners of the focal firm at 
any point in time. As a measure of centrality, degree has been related to better access to 
new alliance opportunities. Firms with more contacts in the network are more likely to be 
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selected as partners (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This variable is expected to have a 
positive impact on alliance formation. Firms that have more alliances are more prone to 
alliance terminations. Therefore, degree may have a positive impact on alliance termination 
too.  
Diversification. The number of unique industry segments in which each firm is 
doing business was counted to measure this variable. The SIC codes were obtained from 
Mergent Online database.  
Geographical region. The location of the firm’s headquarter was used to create this 
variable. Each company was then assigned under one of the following six geographical 
regions: North America, Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and Middle East. 
Geographical distance. This variable measures the distance between the partners 
in the alliance event. In the first set of models, where the dependent variable is time to 
formation, the geographical distance refers to the distance between the partners in the 
formed alliance. In the second set of models, geographical distance refers to the distance 
between the partners in the alliance termination event. 
Age. The age of each firm was calculated at the last year of the study (i.e. 2012). 
Because, year is also one of the control variables, age could not be measured as a 
continuous variable that linearly increases and correlates with time. To reduce the skewness 
in age distribution, like other studies, the logarithm of age was used instead.  
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Size. Larger firms tend to have more resources to fund forming new joint venture. 
They are also more likely to have more connections, which may help them attract more 
partners. Logarithm of sales in US dollar was used to measure this variable.  
Debt to equity ratio. This time-varying variable is measured by dividing debt by 
equity for each firm. Large debt may inhibit an organization’s ability to make new 
investments. Since formation of joint ventures often requires significant financial 
resources, this variable could be used to account for a firm’s ability to pursue new joint 
venture opportunities. 
Current ratio. While debt to equity ratio captures a firm’s long-term liabilities, 
current ratio measures its ability to invest in the short-term. Current ratio is calculated by 
dividing current assets by current liabilities. The larger this number, the greater the excess 
of cash and other short-term receivables that a company can use to for its operations.  
Conclusion 
While using news report as the primary data source provides more complete 
information about the formation and the termination of joint ventures, details of termination 
events are not disclosed in these reports. In most cases, there is no information about the 
reasons behind the dissolution, the size of the operation prior to the termination, and 
whether alliance was successful or not. Ideally, more data should be obtained by directly 
contacting alliance partners. However, this approach requires a huge amount of data 
collection effort and may require a trade off with sample size in order to be feasible 
especially since most companies in the sample are located outside the U.S. However, 
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because sample companies are all publicly traded, complete financial data and other 
partner-level data are available and included. 
Another potential limitation of this data is the exclusion of small firms from the 
sample, which may create a bias towards large companies. As a result, the generalizability 
of the findings may be limited, to some degree, to larger organizations. The focus on the 
larger organization is a common practice in the strategy research. By excluding smaller 
firms from the sample, this study draws a smaller picture of the alliance network. However, 
including smaller firms may reduce the reliability of the data coverage, as small firms may 
not be legally obliged to disclose their joint venture activities. In the face of the trade-off 
between studying a larger network and employing data that is more reliable, I have chosen 
the latter, which adds to the validity of the findings.  
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CHAPTER V – ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Analysis 
The dependent variables, based on the proposed hypotheses, are time to formation 
of new joint ventures and time to termination of existing joint ventures. Because the 
predicted effects deal with the occurrences of some events of interest, survival analysis can 
be used to analyze the data. Survival analysis uses longitudinal data on several subjects 
that may or may not be observed concurrently. Even if the event of interest does not take 
place for some subjects over the observed period (i.e. if there’s right censoring), the 
survival models will be able to correct the resulting bias. Ordinary linear regressions are 
not effective in dealing with censored observations.  
Survival models correctly incorporate information from both censored and 
uncensored data. Due to the observation window being fixed, the study of the subjects is 
both right- and left-censored. Right censoring, in this case, refers to the unobserved events 
that occur after the year 2012. On the other hand, left censoring is due to lack of information 
about the length of time the subjects had been at risk at the beginning of the observation 
window (year 1985).  
There are two dependent variables in survival models: time to event and event status 
(i.e. whether the event has taken place). The model estimates two important functions that 
can describe the probability of the event occurrence. The survival function gives the 
probability of not experiencing the event up to each point in time. The hazard function 
equals the probability that the subject experiences the event at a specific time unit, if it has 
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survived up to that point. These two functions draw a picture of the likelihood of the event 
over time.  
Two popular models are often used in the event studies: parametric and semi-
parametric. Some scholars (Park & Russo, 1996; Polidoro et al., 2011) have used 
parametric estimations of the survival functions, since parametric models have higher 
power than non-parametric and semi-parametric ones. However, in order for the results of 
a parametric estimation to be reliable, one should first establish that the underlying 
assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard function satisfies the parametric 
specification. At the expense of adopting a less powerful model, I use a semi-parametric 
specification, namely Cox proportional hazard model, which makes fewer assumptions 
about the survival function. The results are robust to the use of parametric specifications 
such as Weibull, lognormal, exponential (a specialized form of Weibull function), and 
gamma distributions.  
A survival model with time-varying covariates, such as the one in this dissertation, 
can be described using either the survival function or the hazard function. The survival 
function gives the probability that the event of study happens at time t. We can assume that 
f(t) is the probability density function (p.d.f.), and F(T≤t) is the cumulative distribution 
function that indicating the probability of event T taking place by time t. The survival 
function, will then indicate the probability that the event T has not occurred by time t: 
ܵሺݐሻ ൌ Prሼܶ ൐ ݐሽ ൌ 1 െ ܨሺݐሻ ൌ න ݂ሺݔሻ
ஶ
௧
݀ݔ 
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Therefore, -f(t) equals the derivative of S(t). The hazard function, on the other hand, 
gives the probability of the event at exactly time t: 
ߣሺݐሻ ൌ limௗ௧→଴
Pr	ሼݐ ൏ ܶ ൏ ݐ ൅ ݀ݐ|ܶ ൐ ݐሽ
݀ݐ  
The numerator shows the conditional probability of the event occurring between t 
and t+dt, given that it has not occurred before time t. The hazard function will then equal 
the probability that the event happens in the interval (t, t+dt) divided by the probability of 
the condition, which is that the subjects survives until time t (i.e. S(t)). The probability of 
the event occurring between t and (t 
ߣሺݐሻ ൌ ௙ሺ௧ሻௌሺ௧ሻ  
Replacing f(t) with the negative of the derivative of S(t) results in the following 
equation: 
ߣሺݐሻ ൌ െ ௗௗ௧ ሼ݈݋݃ܵሺݐሻሽ  
Therefore, by specifying either the hazard function or the survival function, one can 
calculate the other: 
ܵሺݐሻ ൌ exp	ሼെ׬ ߣሺݔሻ݀ݔ௧଴ ሽ  
Different classes of parametric survival models assume different shapes for the 
hazard function. The Cox proportional hazard model, on the other hand, make no such 
assumption: 
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ߣሺݐሻ ൌ ݁ሼఈሺ௧ሻାఉభ௑భାఉమ௑మାఉయ௑యା⋯ሽ, 
or: 
log	ሺߣሺݐሻሻ ൌ ߙሺݐሻ ൅ ߚଵ ଵܺ ൅ ߚଶܺଶ ൅ ߚଷܺଷ ൅ ⋯  
As the above equation suggests, the shape of the hazard function is determined by 
the baseline function ߙሺݐሻ , and is constant for all subjects. The covariates affect the 
baseline function proportionally. In the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, the 
effect of ߜ unit change in covariate ଵܺ, can be calculated as below: 
ఒሺ௧|௑భାఋሻ
ఒሺ௧|௑భሻ ൌ
௘ሼഀሺ೟ሻశഁభሺ೉భశഃሻశഁమ೉మశഁయ೉యశ⋯ሽ
௘ሼഀሺ೟ሻశഁభ೉భశഁమ೉మశഁయ೉యశ⋯ሽ ൌ
௘ሼഁభ೉భశഁభഃሽ
௘ሼഁభ೉భሽ ൌ ݁ሺఉభఋሻ  
The level of analysis will be firm-events, with firms as the subjects that are in the 
risk of experiencing the events. Two sets of models will be used; one with time to JV 
formation as the dependent variable and one with time to JV termination as the dependent 
variable. The first set will be used to test hypotheses 1, 3a, 4a, 5a, and 6a, and the second 
set will test hypotheses 2, 3b. 4b, 5b , and 6b.  
The hazard model allows inclusion of the time-varying independent variable. 
Because the same firm may experience more than one event over the period of study, each 
event is treated separately, but not independently. The survival model allows clustering the 
standard error to account for interdependencies, which in this case arise from several events 
belonging to a single firm. This approach imposes less restriction on the specification, 
because it allows the baseline hazard function to vary from one event to another. 
Alternatively, the data was setup such that each firm could have multiple events without 
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treating each event as a separate observation. In this method, all events belonging to a firm 
were constrained to have the same hazard function. Even though both approaches yielded 
similar support for the hypotheses, the former is used due to its flexibility. The analyses 
are all run using the STATA command ‘streg’.  
Results 
Table 2, below shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models 
along with their pairwise correlations. The dependent variables, being binary event/no-
event variables, were not included in the table.  
 
 
 
 Figure 1 - Total Number of Terminations and Formations per Year 
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To ensure the models are not susceptible to excessive multicollinearity, the VIF test 
was run for all models. The maximum VIF score was 2.47, which is below the standard 
threshold of 10. With a maximum condition number of 26.54, which is also below the most 
conservative standard limit (=30), it can be concluded that multicollinearity is not creating 
significant biases in the results (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Number of 
Terminations 0.53 1.20 0 11             
2. Repeated Ties 0.25 0.37 0 2 0.06            
3. Common Partners 0.81 1.38 0 7 0.07 0.55           
4. Debt to Equity Ratio 
(Logged) 0.42 0.20 0.07 3.39 -0.02 -0.02 0.03          
5. Current Ratio 0.75 0.29 0.01 4.11 -0.05 0.10 0.09 0.30         
6. Sales (Logged) 3.84 0.58 1.88 6.16 0.08 0.30 0.40 0.01 0.06        
7. Diversification 5.19 3.01 1 15 -0.08 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.16       
8. Age (Logged) 1.81 0.34 0.95 2.34 -0.05 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.13 0.04 0.01      
9. Degree (Logged) 0.63 0.46 0 1.96 0.08 0.58 0.89 0.04 0.06 0.44 0.17 0.00     
10. Past Formation 
Activity 1.61 3.07 0 26 -0.10 0.42 0.58 0.06 0.10 0.29 0.18 -0.04 0.68    
11. Past Termination 
Activity 0.32 1.01 0 10 -0.05 0.29 0.49 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.12 -0.03 0.57 0.58   
12. Logged Geographical 
Distance (in Formations) 3.30 0.97 0 4.07 0.09 -0.13 -0.07 -0.18 -0.20 0.09 -0.29 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04  
13. Logged Geographical 
Distance (in Formations) 3.44 0.80 0 4.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.16 -0.08 -0.19 -0.13 -0.14 0.22 
Note: Number of Subjects: 87  
9
6
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Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results for the two sets of models. In Table 3, the 
dependent variable is time to formation of a joint venture.  
 
TABLE 3. Survival Analysis Estimates of Joint Venture Formation 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Number of Terminations -0.12* (0.06) 
-0.05 
 (0.06) 
-0.12 
  (0.08) 
-0.06 
 (0.06) 
-0.07 
  (0.08) 
Repeated Ties      0.82**  (0.26) 
      0.88***
   (0.25)   
Repeated Ties × Number of  
Terminations   
    0.24*
   (0.11)   
Common Partners         0.26*** (0.05) 
    0.26***
(0.05) 
Common Partners × Number 
of Terminations     
0.01 
(0.03) 
Debt to Equity Ratio  0.03  (0.20) 
 0.56* 
(0.25) 
 0.57* 
(0.25) 
 0.30 
 (0.27) 
0.31 
(0.27) 
Current Ratio  -0.44†  (0.24) 
-0.53* 
(0.21) 
-0.51* 
(0.21) 
  -0.45+ 
 (0.23) 
-0.44† 
(0.23) 
Sales (Logged)   0.18†  (0.10) 
    0.61***
(0.13) 
    0.61*** 
(0.13) 
     
0.64*** 
 (0.16) 
    0.65***
(0.15) 
Diversification  0.02  (0.02) 
0.02 
 (0.02) 
0.02 
 (0.02) 
 0.01 
 (0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Age (Logged) -0.21  (0.13) 
-0.08 
 (0.17) 
-0.10 
  (0.16) 
-0.04 
 (0.16) 
-0.04 
 (0.16) 
Degree      2.60***  (0.16)     
Past Formation Activity -0.02  (0.01) 
    0.09***
(0.02) 
    0.08*** 
(0.02) 
     
0.07*** 
 (0.02) 
    0.07***
(0.02) 
Past Termination Activity -0.05* (0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
  (0.04) 
-0.01 
 (0.04) 
Geographical Distance 0.04 (0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Chi-squared 1219.94 711.32 1566.23 644.93 695.78 
Notes: 
(1) No of Observation: 1120. 
(2) † p ≤.10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. Two-sided tests.  Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. 
(3) Dummy variables corresponding to the focal firms’ geographical regions are included 
in all models. 
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In models 1 through 6, the dependent variable is time to formation of a new joint 
venture. Model 1 includes the main effect of alliance termination on the formation of new 
relationships to test the first hypothesis. The significant coefficient suggest that the number 
of joint venture terminations negatively impacts the likelihood of new JV formation for the 
focal firm. Based on the estimated coefficient, one standard deviation increase in the 
number of terminations of the focal firm reduces the probability of joint venture formation 
by ሺ݁ି଴.ଵଶൈଵ.ଶ଴ െ 1ሻ ൌ െ13.4%.  
Models 2 and 3 include the main and the moderating effects of repeated ties 
between a firm and its current partners. Due to high correlations and risks of 
multicollinearity, degree was removed from the variable list in this model. As the 
correlation matrix suggests, a firm’s degree (i.e. number of partners) highly correlates with 
the number of repeated of ties between it and its partners. The main effect of repeated ties 
is positive, which is in agreement with prior literature on alliance formation (Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999; Hagedoorn, 2006). The positive and significant interaction between 
number of terminations and repeated ties is in agreement with the predictions of hypothesis 
3a. Therefore hypothesis 5a is rejected.  
The main effect of the number of repeated ties is positive and significant. Based on 
the coefficients of model 3, one standard deviation increase in the number of repeated ties 
increases the likelihood of alliance formation by ሺ݁଴.଼଼ൈ଴.ଷ଻ െ 1ሻ ൌ 38.4%. The effect of 
terminations on future formations is weaker when the average number of repeated ties is 
higher for the focal firm. When repeated ties is zero, one standard deviation increase in the 
number of termination results in 13.4% decrease in the probability of alliance formation. 
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When repeated ties equals one, one standard deviation increase in the number of 
terminations, improves the likelihood of formation by 15.4%6. 
 
                                                            
 
6 ݁ሼି଴.ଵଶൈଵ.ଶା଴.ଶସൈଵ.ଶൈଵሽ ൌ 15.4% 
TABLE 4. Survival Analysis Estimates of Joint Venture Termination 
Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Past Termination Activity 0.07 (0.04) 
  0.12** 
(0.04) 
   0.23***
(0.06) 
 0.10* 
(0.04) 
   0.32*** 
(0.06) 
Repeated Ties   0.70*(0.29) 
 0.79* 
(0.32)   
Repeated Ties × Past 
Termination  
Activity 
  -0.22* (0.09)   
Common Partners       0.19** (0.06) 
   0.28*** 
(0.07) 
Common Partners × Past 
Termination Activity     
  -0.09*** 
(0.02) 
Debt to Equity Ratio  0.36  (0.34) 
 0.64† 
(0.34) 
 0.62† 
(0.34) 
0.44 
(0.33) 
0.46 
(0.32) 
Current Ratio -0.82* (0.37) 
-0.80* 
(0.35) 
-0.83* 
(0.34) 
-0.77* 
(0.37) 
-0.81* 
(0.33) 
Sales (Logged) 0.01 (0.21) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
0.18 
(0.22) 
0.21 
(0.23) 
0.14 
(0.22) 
Diversification 0.01 (0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
 (0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Age (Logged) -0.35*(0.16) 
-0.29 
 (0.22) 
-0.28 
 (0.23) 
-0.23 
 (0.20) 
-0.27 
 (0.22) 
Degree     1.43***(0.28)     
Past Formation Activity 0.03 (0.02) 
  0.07** 
(0.02) 
  0.07** 
(0.02) 
  0.06** 
(0.02) 
  0.07** 
(0.02) 
Geographical Distance  -0.19** (0.06) 
  -0.27***
(0.06) 
  -0.27***
(0.06) 
  -0.26*** 
(0.06) 
  -0.26*** 
(0.05) 
Chi-squared 7665.72 2645.77 2131.42 2485.22 1457.49 
Notes: 
(1) No of Events: 460. 
(2) † p ≤.10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. Two-sided tests.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
(3) Dummy variables corresponding to the focal firms’ geographical regions are 
included in all models. 
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Models 4 and 5 test the moderating influence of structural embeddedness. Based 
on the coefficients, the number of common partners increases the likelihood of alliance 
formation for the focal firm. One standard deviation increase in the average number of 
common partners increases the likelihood of alliance formation by ሺ݁଴.ଶ଺ൈଵ.ଷ଼ െ 1ሻ ൌ
43.2% . However, the interaction of number of terminations and number of common 
partners is not significant, which rejects both hypotheses 4a and 6a. 
Table 4, shows the results for the models where time to termination of a joint 
venture is the dependent variable. Model 6 tests the main effect of past terminations, i.e. 
terminations in the past three years, on the next JV termination by the focal firm. The non-
significant (p-value=0.12) coefficient rejects hypotheses 2. However, in models 7 to 10, 
the effect of past termination on future termination becomes significant in the predicted 
direction. Based on the coefficients in models 8 and 10, one standard deviation increase in 
the number of terminations, increases the probability of future terminations by 24.1% and 
31.9%, respectively. 
The role of relational embeddedness is tested in Models 7 and 8. Both the main effect and 
the interaction effect of repeated ties are significant. The results suggest that having 
multiple repeated ties with partners increases the likelihood of alliance termination. Firms 
with more alliances are at a higher risk of experiencing terminations, which explains the 
positive effect of the number of repeated ties on alliance terminations. The size of this 
effect, based on coefficients in model 8, is such that one standard deviation in the number 
of repeated ties, increase the likelihood of termination by 33.9%. Therefore hypothesis 3b 
is supported, while hypothesis 5b is rejected. 
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In Models 9 and 10, I have added the number of common partners as a measure of 
structural embeddedness. The main effect of the number of common partners is positive, 
which means firms that are structurally embedded are more likely to terminate their 
relationships. However, this effect may be due to the fact that structurally embedded firms 
are involved in more joint venture, and are therefore, more likely to experience 
terminations. One standard deviation increase in the number of common partners increases 
the probability of future joint venture termination by 47.2%. 
 Moreover, the interaction effect of the number of the number of common partners 
is negative, which is in agreement with hypothesis 4b. Therefore, hypothesis 6b is rejected. 
When the focal firm’s average number of common partners is 0, one standard deviation 
increase in the number of past terminations increases the likelihood of future terminations 
by 46.8%. In contrast, when the average number of common partners is 1, one standard 
deviation increase in the number of past terminations, increases future termination 
probability by 31.7%.  
Conclusions 
Using data on the alliance activities of top global chemical companies in 
combination with financial and firm-level variables, the proposed hypotheses were tested. 
The analysis was performed using the Cox proportional hazard specification on two sets of 
models. In the first group of models, the dependent variable was time to formation of a 
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joint venture by the subject. In the second group of models, time to joint venture 
termination was used as the dependent variable.  
The baseline models in both settings tested and showed the adverse effect of 
alliance termination on focal firms’ future alliance formation and termination. The 
moderators were then added to test the competing hypotheses about the role of social 
embeddedness on the effect of alliance termination.  
The results presented above support the hypothesis that joint venture termination 
has a negative impact on future alliance formation. This effect is consistent across all 
models in Table 3. The effect of joint venture termination on the termination of firm’s other 
JV relationships was not significant in the baseline model. However, Models 7 to 10 show 
significant effects for past terminations on future terminations in the predicted direction of 
hypothesis 2. 
The findings are also in support of the information benefits of network 
embeddedness rather than the social control benefits. The effect of termination on future 
formation is less negative, when the focal firm has several repeated ties with its partner. 
Similarly, past terminations have weaker adverse effects on future terminations, if partners 
are relationally embedded.  
In addition, the results suggest that focal firms with more triads in their ego network 
(i.e. firms with more common partners in their relationships) are affected less negatively 
by the termination event. The effect of past alliance terminations on both future alliance 
terminations and future alliance formations, is weaker when the focal firm’s partners are 
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connected. In the following section I discuss the theoretical and practical implications of 
the findings.  
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CHAPTER VI – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation I tested hypotheses relating to the outcomes of alliance 
termination. Specifically, I put forward arguments for potentially negative social outcomes 
for firms that terminate their joint venture relationships. Prior literature has contended and 
shown that alliances are inherently unstable governance structures for inter-firm 
collaborations (Das & Teng, 2000a). However, there is no study of the actual outcomes of 
alliance dissolution for partners. In my main effect hypotheses, I have posited that alliance 
terminations can negatively influence partners’ abilities to form new relationships and to 
maintain their existing partnership.  
In my arguments for such effects, I have put forward both economic and social 
mechanisms. Termination of an alliance can block the focal firm’s access to valuable 
resources shared in the partnership, making it a less attractive potential partner. 
Disconnection from current partners can also reduce firms’ access to new information and 
economic opportunities that are passed through the alliance network from one partner to 
the other, which delays their discovery of new opportunities including collaborative 
ventures. 
The termination event can also have a negative reputational impact on the partners, 
as they may be perceived to take short-term approaches in their alliances. Because strategic 
alliance and especially joint ventures require significant long-term investments that cannot 
be easily mobilized towards other activities, firms involved in alliance termination may be 
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viewed as unreliable partners. Some alliance failures may also be attributed to the friction 
between the partners resulting from non-cooperative behavior (Greve et al., 2010).  
Based on the aforementioned arguments, I hypothesized that alliance terminations 
can trigger dissolution of the partners’ relationships with other actors or hinder their ability 
to form new relationships. The results presented in the previous section gave an overall 
support for this proposition. Interestingly, the negative effect of alliance termination was 
stronger on formation of new relationships compared to its effect on the termination of 
existing ties. This finding may be explained by the dominance of economic motives over 
social drivers of firm behavior. Withdrawing from an existing joint venture with a firm 
involved in a terminated alliance creates costs and may be economically unattractive. The 
inertia resulting from an attempt to save invested resources may prevent third party actors 
from terminating their relationships with the focal firm. Even though the termination may 
be viewed as a social non-conformity.  
To further our understanding of the impact of alliance termination, I also 
investigated the effect of partners’ embeddedness in the alliance network on the 
termination outcomes. The social structure surrounding a firm can play a role in how it is 
affected by the termination event. Current literature suggests two main perspectives on the 
benefits of social networks: informational advantage and social control (Gulati, 1998). 
Through competing hypotheses I tested whether one or the other mechanism is dominant 
in determining the termination outcomes.  
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The presented results suggest that the informational benefits resulting from dense 
network structures overweigh the social control that restricts firms’ actions. Firms that 
terminate their alliances are able to leverage their network resources such as access to 
information, discovery of new venture opportunities, and referrals for new alliances, to 
overcome the negative impact of a discontinued relationship. Based on numerous 
propositions by social network scholars but without any empirical evidence, network 
closure should reduce the actors’ autonomy, facilitate formation of shared norms, and result 
in collective sanctions. Relational and structural embeddedness, in particular, have been 
shown to increase alliance stability by creating retaliation threat and possible punishment 
by third party actors. The findings of this dissertation do not suggest such dynamics in the 
network of global joint ventures in the chemical industry. However, lack of support for the 
social control mechanisms should be interpreted with caution. A conservative conclusion 
can be that the negative impact of social control dynamics are not strong enough to 
overcome the positive effect of informational advantage.  
Study Context  
The context used in this dissertation for the study of alliance terminations is 
international joint ventures among leading chemical companies. Due to the lack of data on 
alliance termination activities in the major databases, data collection for this dissertation 
involved semi-manual analysis of news reports, industry magazines, wires, PR 
announcements, etc. Despite the large number of publications used to identify alliance 
activities, there might still be some overlooked alliance terminations and formations. 
However, the omitted activities are most likely smaller deals that are immaterial enough 
104 
 
not to be disclosed. The findings, therefore, should apply more reliably to the termination 
of alliances that are significant. The same limitation, however, applies to almost all studies 
of strategic alliances.  
Another feature of the sample that should be taken into consideration is the focus 
on larger firms. In my focus on top companies, I made a trade-off between available reliable 
information on a smaller sample of firms versus larger random sample about which little 
accurate information is publicly accessible. Many scholars have taken the same approach 
and chosen a more complete picture of a smaller world over having a broader view with 
low quality information. As a result, the findings may be more applicable to large firms, 
even though the fundamental mechanisms might apply to other contexts.  
The generalizability of the results to other context also depends on the nature of the 
relationships. In strategic alliance networks, economic motives are the basic reasons behind 
alliance formations. Consequently, social mechanisms like the ones discussed in this 
dissertation may play a smaller role in such networks. On the other hand, more socialized 
networks like friendship networks, may be more affected by the hypothesized dynamics.  
Equilibrium Condition 
The findings of this dissertation suggests that firms that terminate their alliances 
face some difficulty in forming new relationships and are at higher risk of further alliance 
terminations. Given these findings an immediate question that comes to mind is what the 
equilibrium condition may look like in terms of the alliance network structure. To answer 
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to this question, we should first identify the mechanisms that drive the network dynamics 
resulting from alliance terminations.  
Firstly, if the proposed hypotheses hold, and assuming everything else constant, 
one may expect that the occurrence of alliance terminations may lead to a reduction in 
partners’ number of alliances. Over time, this can result in the isolation of some firms and 
increase in the density of ties in the rest of the alliance network. Based on the current 
findings, firms that are highly embedded will not be affected as much as firms positioned 
in less connected areas of the network. Therefore, less embedded firms may be isolated 
from the rest of the network in the long-run and highly embedded firms may become even 
more connected.  
Secondly, we should note that past alliance terminations are not the only 
determinant of future alliance activity. Aside from the effect of alliance termination on 
future terminations and formations of alliances, we should take into account the exogenous 
factors that could trigger a break-up such as unsatisfactory alliance performance, 
technology obsolescence, or regulatory changes. Therefore, we should observe, even in the 
equilibrium, occurrences of alliance termination everywhere in the network. However, 
such alliance terminations may affect firms differently depending on their network 
position.  
The long-term effect of the aforementioned isolation and densification mechanisms 
can divide the network into multiple clusters of firms. As terminations take place, clusters 
may break into two, or become more disconnected from other clusters, while firms within 
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clusters may become more connected. To confirm the equilibrium condition of the 
hypothesized dynamics, we should investigate which ties are more likely to dissolve as 
alliance termination occurs. Moreover, we need to identify the ties that are more likely to 
form after the occurrence of a termination. The current findings do not make such 
distinction and therefore, are not sufficient to verify the eventual network state. This, 
however, opens up a new venue for future research.  
Contribution to Extant Literature 
This dissertation contributes to the existing literature on strategic alliances by 
answering an important question about the alliance lifecycle. Our current understanding of 
alliance termination is limited to why alliances are unstable and what factors increase the 
life of a partnership. However, to my knowledge, there is no study of the impact of alliance 
termination as a separate event, on the partners.  
This study also adds to the research on the benefits of social networks, by 
empirically testing the effect of two competing mechanisms proposed in the existing 
literature. Mainly the proposition that network cohesion can induce alliance stability by 
creating a safeguard mechanism against alliance termination is rejected. In other words, 
the loss of autonomy of firms in densely connected networks seems to be negligible 
compared to the informational benefits resulting from network cohesion. 
Future Directions 
By investigating an overlooked part of the lifecycle of strategic alliances, this 
dissertation invites discussion on the consequences of alliance termination. The presented 
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results tested the effect of terminations on future alliance formation and terminations in the 
context of international joint ventures among leading chemical companies. The validity of 
these results should also be verified in other populations such as small and medium size 
firms, other industries, and other alliance types.  
Another area for future research is testing the potential impact of alliance 
terminations on financial performance, firm’s innovative outputs, and other firm-level and 
network-level outcomes. The type of alliances and the alliance objectives might be 
essential factors to identify economic outcomes of alliance terminations. Therefore, further 
data collection might be necessary to accommodate testing other alliance outcomes. The 
network impact of alliance termination is also a possible direction for future research. 
Changes triggered by dissolution of a tie may be spread to affect the broader structure of 
the alliance network.  
The findings may also contribute to the structural holes theory by providing some 
explanation on how structural holes are created and how they evolve. Structural holes 
provide autonomy and access to non-redundant new information. The two benefit of social 
network discussed in this dissertation may be closely related to the benefits of structural 
holes. Therefore, an immediate extension of this study can be to investigate the impact of 
structural holes on termination outcomes. Moreover, the changes triggered by alliance 
termination can lead to the formation of structural holes in the partners’ local network.  
The contextual variables used in this dissertation, namely relational and structural 
embeddedness, can also be extended to include other social and economic factors. Other 
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network position variables such as centrality, clique membership, density, reach, 
connectivity, etc. may also be tested as moderators of the effect of alliance terminations on 
firm-level outcomes. Economic variables such as alliance size, partner size, technological 
capability, alliance type, etc. can also be candidates for the moderating relationship.  
Another interesting area of future research can be the impact of changes in one 
network on other parallel networks. For example, changes in the alliance network can affect 
the structure of knowledge flow network. Especially in the case of technological alliances, 
termination of ties between two companies may influence the transfer of technologies 
between them. This proposition may be tested using the patent citation or patent co-citation 
networks and can be extended to include the reverse effect, i.e. the influence of changes in 
the knowledge flow network on the alliance network structure. 
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